ByLawyers News and Updates

Deposit – Forfeiture of deposit

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

A vendor may forfeit a deposit if the contract is ended but there are some circumstances where relief against forfeiture may be granted.

There are two basic principles in property law that generally co-exist but are capable of coming into conflict:

  • a deposit is an earnest paid to secure the performance of the contract; and
  • the law will not enforce a penalty imposed for breach of contract.

These two principles are usually able to co-exist as a result of the law recognising that a payment that constitutes a genuine pre-estimate of a vendor’s losses upon default by the purchaser is not a penalty and that a deposit of 10% of the price is an acceptable pre-estimate of such losses.

It is therefore fair to say that, in circumstances where the purchaser has paid a 10% deposit, a vendor who seeks to forfeit that deposit as a result of the purchaser’s breach of contract will be on safe ground. Section 49 Property Law Act confers on the court a discretion to grant the purchaser relief against forfeiture but it is generally accepted that the purchaser must show exceptional circumstances to justify the exercise of that discretion in circumstances where the deposit is 10%.

An example of such exceptional circumstances may be where the purchaser has taken possession of the property with the agreement of the vendor and has expended money on the property such as to have increased the value of the property. A court might find that the vendor is not entitled to retain the benefit of the funds expended as well as the deposit. But, as a general rule, the vendor can forfeit a deposit of 10% that has been paid by the purchaser. Equally, it will be rare for a vendor to be entitled to retain a deposit of more than 10%, as such a payment exceeds a reasonable pre-estimate of the vendor’s losses and amounts to a penalty.

Often, the deposit is expressed as being ‘10% payable as to $X on signing the contract and balance in 7 days’. Such a formula recognises that a purchaser might not always have a full 10% deposit available at the point of signing the contract and may require a short period of time to arrange for the balance to be available. If the purchaser breaches the contract the vendor needs to call upon the assistance of the court to recover the unpaid deposit and the spectre of a penalty arises. However, it has long been accepted that a vendor is entitled to recover any unpaid part of a 10% deposit notwithstanding that the contract has been ended – Bot v Ristevski [1981] VicRp 13 adopted as recently as Melegant & Sundrum P/L v Zhong [2017] VCC 1868.

However, where the deposit is expressed as some amount less than 10%, the court will not assist the vendor to recover 10%. This has been the situation in NSW for some time and now also applies in Victoria following Simcevski v Dixon (No 2) [2017] VSC 531 were the contract provided for a deposit of 5% and the court rejected a claim by the vendor for a further 5%.

In that case the vendor sought to rely upon a condition in the contract that provided that, if the contract was ended by the vendor, 10% of the price was to be forfeited to the vendor, whether it had been paid or not. Whilst the amount (10%) bore a resemblance to a deposit, the contract provided that the deposit was 5%, so the court had no hesitation in finding that any amount beyond the specified deposit was a penalty and thereby unenforceable, whether supported by a contractual right or not. It may therefore be concluded that any attempt to impose a liability beyond the specified deposit will be an unenforceable penalty.

One formula that has not as yet been scrutinised by a court is ‘deposit of 10% payable as to 5% on signing and the balance of 5% at settlement’. The 10% deposit will not be a penalty and the delay in payment should mean that the vendor is able to recover the full 10% in accordance with Bot v Ristevski.

Tip Box

  • the law will not enforce a penalty for breach of contract
  • a 10% deposit is not a penalty
  • a vendor cannot recover more than the specified deposit

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states

Vendor’s duty to co-operate

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Contracts often impose specific obligations on purchasers but these may be accompanied by implied obligations on vendors to co-operate with the purchaser to allow the purchaser to fulfil those obligations.

Contracts of sale of land often include conditions that require a purchaser to undertake some action that will put the purchaser in a position to complete the contract. Such conditions are known as ‘contingent conditions’ in that the purchaser does not promise that the condition will be satisfied but acknowledges that if the condition is satisfied, the contract will no longer be conditional on that condition being satisfied.

A common example is a finance condition whereby the contract is conditional (contingent) upon the purchaser obtaining finance to assist the purchaser to complete the contract, or at least to make application for such finance and notify the vendor of the outcome. The purchaser does not promise that finance will be obtained, but obtaining finance will mean that the contract will proceed. The failure of a contingent condition will generally give a right to terminate a contract.

Contingent conditions may be in contrasted to promissory conditions whereby one, or both, of the contracting parties promise to do something; such as to adjust outgoings, or provide documents, or settle the transaction in a particular way. Generally, the failure of a promissory condition will not give a right of termination unless the condition is essential, or goes to the root of the contract.

Conditions may be both contingent and promissory, as indeed is the finance condition in GC14 of the standard contract. The contract is contingent upon the purchaser obtaining finance, but the purchaser also promises to apply for finance and advise of the outcome of that application. If the purchaser fails to comply with the requirements of the condition, the contingency is deemed to have been satisfied and the contract proceeds unconditionally in respect of finance.

Such conditions specifically impose obligations on the purchaser but also impliedly impose obligations on the vendor. Grubb v Toomey [2003] TASSC 131 and Grieve v Enge [2006] QCA 213 are authority for the proposition that a vendor who agrees to a finance condition in a contract impliedly agrees to make the property available to the purchaser for the purpose of a valuation required by a prospective lender and that a vendor who fails to comply with this obligation will be in breach of contract.

Simcevski v Dixon [2017] VSC 197 concerned the sale of a commercial property that had previously been used as a petrol station and that the purchaser wished to redevelop. The purchaser required finance for the purchase and the financier required a valuation to include an assessment of the likely contamination of the site. However, the contract was not conditional upon finance so it was not open to the purchaser to argue that the implied obligation to make the land available for valuation extended to an obligation to allow investigations.

The purchaser sought to rely on a Special Condition in the contract that stated that the vendor gave no warranty in respect of contamination, that the purchaser had inspected the property and that the purchaser released the vendor from any liability in relation to contamination. The condition also referred to the purchaser conducting investigations in relation to contamination and the purchaser sought to argue that this created an express or implied obligation on the purchaser to conduct those investigations and a consequent implied obligation on the vendor to make the property available for the purpose of conducting those investigations.

In the context of the contract this seemed an ambitious argument, as the purpose of the Special Condition appeared to be to protect the vendor and the court concluded as much. Thus, the court held that the Special Condition did not create an express or implied obligation on the purchaser to conduct investigations. Whilst the court did recognise that a vendor does have an implied general duty to co-operate with the purchaser to allow the purchaser to gain the benefits anticipated to flow from the contract, that duty did not extend to making the property available for the proposed investigations in this case as the purchaser had no obligation to conduct those investigations.

A final argument of the purchaser was that the refusal by the vendor to allow the investigations to be conducted prevented the purchaser from completing the contract and that a vendor in such circumstances should not be entitled to terminate the contract, as to do so would allow the vendor to benefit from its wrongdoing. The court, whilst acknowledging the Prevention Principle, held that, on the facts of this case, the Principle did not apply.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

GST withholding

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Six months after the ATO introduced new GST Withholding obligations on purchasers of real estate, those changes are starting to have an effect.

In an attempt to reduce avoidance of GST obligations by vendors arising from the practice of illegal phoenix activity, the ATO introduced a GST Withholding obligation on 1 July 2018. The intent of these changes is to require purchasers of certain types of real estate to withhold a portion of the purchase price from the vendor and pay that money to the ATO, to be applied as a credit towards the vendor’s GST liability. This is not a new tax, just a new method of collecting an existing tax. However, as is usually the case when the ATO seeks to transfer responsibility for tax collection, unintended consequences may result in the ‘innocent’ tax collector facing unexpected consequences.

Notice

Unfortunately, the introduction of the Withholding obligation has been complicated by the introduction of a parallel NOTICE obligation on vendors. It is logical in a transaction that generates a purchaser Withholding obligation to require the vendor to notify the purchaser that the obligation exists, but the vendor NOTICE obligation does not mirror the Withholding obligation and applies to a wider set of transactions than the Withholding obligation applies to. By way of example, one of the categories where the purchaser must Withhold is the sale of NEW residential premises but ALL vendors of ALL residential premises are obliged to give a NOTICE. In the case of not-new residential premises, the NOTICE states that the purchaser is NOT obliged to Withhold and given that the vast majority of residential sales are of existing (as opposed to new) properties the effect of the legislation is to require a vast number of vendors to advise the purchaser that no Withholding is required. This obligation appears to be counter-intuitive and has resulted in considerable misunderstanding in relation to the application of the Withholding obligation. It is difficult to glean the motivation behind this wider NOTICE obligation and perhaps this anomaly might be rectified in any review of the legislation.

The most efficient way to deal with the NOTICE obligation when no Withholding is required is to include the NOTICE in the contract with the statement that no Withholding is required. If Withholding is required, the NOTICE must provide the vendor’s name, vendor’s ABN, specify the Withholding amount and when it is payable (at settlement) and may be provided in the contract, or subsequently.

Obligation

In summary, the purchaser must Withhold if the contract relates to:

  1. new residential premises.

This category can be seen to apply to apartment and townhouse sales where there was a perception of illegal phoenix activity.

  1. potential residential land.

This category applies to greenfield subdivision sales, again a potential phoenix scenario.

However, this category is wider than lots on a proposed plan. It applies to potential residential land that is included in a (registered) plan of subdivision. It therefore applies to sales of residential lots off-the-plan (because the plan is registered prior to settlement) but also applies to the sale of ANY residential land that is a lot on a plan of subdivision – effectively ALL vacant residential land.

However, Withholding is only required where the vendor makes a taxable supply. Off-the-plan sales by land developers will be in the course of an enterprise and therefore taxable supplies attracting Withholding, but most sales of one-off vacant residential lots will NOT be in the course of an enterprise and therefore will not be a taxable supply and will not attract Withholding. Notwithstanding that no Withholding is required, the vendor must still give the purchaser NOTICE that Withholding does not apply.

Again, this seems counter-intuitive and restricting the obligation to off-the-plan sales might be a future improvement.

Payment

If the vendor gives NOTICE that Withholding applies the purchaser must lodge a form of Withholding notification with the ATO and will then receive a lodgement reference number (LRN) acknowledging the notification and a payment reference number (PRN) to be used when lodging a settlement date confirmation form at the time of payment to the ATO.

Tip Box

•GST Withholding applies to new residential premises and vacant residential land.

•Withholding NOTICE must be given with ALL residential sales.

WA – Electronic lodgement for all eligible documents

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From 1 December 2017 – Any lodgement case consisting of eligible discharges, transfers, mortgages, caveats and withdrawal of caveats must be lodged electronically. Are you E-Conveyancing ready? See our paper E-Conveyancing – Get Connected for information and implementation timelines

Land transfer duty benefits

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

State Revenue Office has announced changes to the benefits available to purchasers of real estate to take effect from 1 July 2017.

Imposition of duty on transfer of land in Victoria is a significant source of revenue for the State government. It is also a significant source of angst for taxpayers and people involved in the real estate industry. Changes to the duty regime are often seen as levers for economic development and as such those changes are usually designed to achieve a politically beneficial outcome for the government.

The issue of housing affordability, particularly for first home buyers, is a hot button political issue and the duty changes are targeted at that demographic. The changes apply to contracts of sale after 1 July 2017, which may mean that the months of May and June will be ‘slow’ in this marketplace, followed by substantial uplift from July onwards.

Traditionally a first home buyer needs a minimum of the 10% deposit. Given that duty on a purchase of $500,000 is in the range of 5% the government impost is half of that hard fought for deposit. Granting an exemption or concession in relation to duty should therefore provide a substantial impetus for sales. The contrary argument is that it will simply bring more people into the market and effectively increase the price of housing by the amount of the benefit. This dispute between supply/demand will no doubt continue to occupy the attention of economists but we lawyers will move on to the practical consequences of the changes.

FIRST HOME BUYERS – both new and established homes

Full exemption for purchase price up to $600,000.

Reducing concession between $600,000 and $750,000 (no concession at $750,000).

Requirements:
  1. Purchaser and partner must qualify as ‘first home buyers’; and
  2. Purchaser must be an Australian citizen or permanent resident; and
  3. Purchaser must use property as Principal Place of Residence for a continuous period of 12 months commencing within 12 months of possession.

Importantly in the new home market, the ‘dutiable amount’ is calculated after taking into account deductions relating to the cost of construction post-contract.

One segment of the new home market is based on the first home buyer purchasing the land and then entering into a separate building contract for construction. In this case the dutiable value is based on the land contract and will normally come within the full exemption available up to $600,000. However another method has the first home buyer enter into a land and building contract for the total value of the land and construction. This may have a contract price above the $600,000 threshold but the exemption is available if the value of the land as at the date of the contract is below $600,000. Adopting the Fixed Percentage Method of allocating value in such cases will mean that the full exemption will be available so long as an amount equal to 55% of the contract price is below $600.000, allowing for total contract prices of well over $1m.

This takes us into the realms of:

OFF THE PLAN SALES

Substantial duty concessions have always been available in Victoria in relation to off the plan sales. The availability of this concession is to be limited after 1 July 2017 to properties to be used by the purchaser as their principal place of residence.

The concession is available where the dutiable value of the property is less than $550,000. Importantly, the calculation of dutiable value allows for deduction from the contract price of an amount that represents the value of construction to be undertaken after the date of the contract and prior to settlement. The Fixed Percentage Method of calculation of post-contract construction cost allocates cost as follows:

Single dwelling
  • Construction cost 45%
  • Land component 55%
Multi-lot
  • Construction cost 60%
  • Land component 40%
High rise
  • Construction cost 75%
  • Land component 25%

If a purchaser signs a contract before any construction commences the dutiable value will be below the $550,000 threshold provided that the contact price is less than:

  • Single dwelling $1,000,000
  • Multi lot $1,375,000
  • High rise $2,200,000

and duty will be calculated at the concession rate available to purchasers who intend to occupy the property as their principal place of residence.

The concession that was previously available for investment properties and commercial developments will cease as at 30 June 2017 and the concession will only apply to owner-occupied properties.

Disclosure of death

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Does a vendor of real estate have an obligation to disclose that a death occurred on the property in the past?

The underlying principle governing the relationship at common law between a vendor and a purchaser is caveat emptor – let the purchaser beware. The application of that principle would mean that a purchaser should conduct its own inquiries in relation to the antecedents of the property and that the vendor has no obligation to voluntarily disclose the circumstances of any deaths and, indeed, whether such deaths occurred.

The vendor could not actively mislead the purchaser, as misrepresentation is an exception to caveat emptor, but only in the limited circumstances of a positive misrepresentation. Misrepresentation by silence is not known to the common law in this regard and a vendor who avoided making any positive misrepresentations was safe.

However the vendor’s common law disclosure obligations have been substantially supplemented by the statutory obligations set out in s 32 Sale of Land Act 1962. These include the obligation to disclose title restrictions, planning obligations and the service of any notices affecting the land, but none of the many obligations imposed by s 32 appear to extend to an obligation to disclose that a death occurred on the property.

There is much to be said for the argument that a vendor should not have any obligation in this regard. There are many practical difficulties of deciding which deaths attract the obligation. A sensational murder immediately prior to sale might attract the obligation, but what of the natural death of a long term owner? There are infinite possibilities between these two situations and striking a fair balance would be difficult. And would the obligation be limited to death? What about other crimes like drug production or paedophilia? The law must not shy away from difficult tasks, but these practical considerations highlight the potential difficulties.

Some American States, which also apply caveat emptor, have created specific disclosure obligations for what are known as ‘stigmatised properties’, which cover not only death but also other criminal activity and, perhaps only in America, paranormal activity. An arbitrary period of 3 years prior to sale (or leasing) provides some recognition that death is a natural event.

Estate Agents

Agents are subject to regulation designed to protect both vendor and purchaser. Thus, whilst the vendor might not owe a duty to the purchaser, the agent does.

A NSW case involving the sale of a home in which two sons had murdered their parents led to an outcry and the vendors voluntarily terminated the contract, preventing a Court determination of the issue. However the agent was found guilty of disciplinary charges for failing to inform the prospective purchaser and NSW agents are now subject to a specific rule requiring them to bring such matters to the attention of the purchaser. New Zealand has similar requirements in relation to suicide.

No such specific ethical obligation exists for Victorian agents but there is a general duty of honesty and best practice that might be used as a basis for a claim by a purchaser. Agents are also subject to the general duties not to mislead or deceive, positively or by silence, created by the Australian Consumer Law and this is likely to be the direction of attack from a disaffected purchaser.

Charles Lloyd Property Group Pty Ltd v Buchanan [2013] VSC 148

This case provides some hope that the Walls of Jericho will not crumble in the face of the trumpets playing the ACL tune. The purchaser sought to avoid a contract based on post-contract discovery that a suicide had occurred on the land. There were many factors against the purchaser, not least of which was a confirmation of the contract by the purchaser AFTER the knowledge of the suicide had been acquired, that resulted in the failure of the complaint but it was somewhat re-assuring that the Court found that the complaint should be dismissed as it ‘had no reasonable prospect of success’.

Tip Box

  • Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.
  • Properties may be stigmatised by criminal activity.
  • Vendors presently probably have no disclosure obligations.
  • Estate agents may be obliged to disclose as a result of their duty to purchaser.

Septic situation

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Not many s 32 cases make it to the Supreme Court. McHutchison v Asli [2017] VSC 258 is an exception and it provides an authoritative answer to a reasonably common scenario.

The vendor was selling a property that was sewered by means of a septic tank system. That sentence sounds somewhat contradictory as the word ‘sewered’ implies that the property is connected to a system that removes waste from the property entirely, rather than collecting the effluent in an on-site tank for treatment and dispersal within the property. The property was a large property in an outlying suburb of Melbourne and, for people familiar with the local conditions, a septic system was perhaps the norm. However, the purchaser had no experience of local conditions and sought to avoid the contract on the basis of a breach of the vendor’s disclosure obligations pursuant to s 32 Sale of Land Act 1962.

The purchaser’s primary argument was that the vendor had breached s 32H in relation to disclosure of services. That section requires a vendor to disclose if particular services, including sewerage, are NOT connected to the property. In error, the vendor’s conveyancer deleted reference to sewerage in this part of the Vendors Statement which was conceded by the vendor to be incorrect and accepted by the Court as constituting a false statement that sewerage WAS connected. The vendor sought to excuse this false disclosure as a clerical error and relied upon the fact that a certificate from Yarra Valley Water indicated that sewerage was not connected. However provision of this certificate, which was described by the Judge as ‘opaque in the extreme’ in relation to sewerage service, could not overcome the false representation in the Statement itself that sewerage was connected. In this regard it was assumed throughout the judgment that reference to ‘connected’ meant that the property must be connected to an external sewerage system and a septic system could never satisfy the need to have sewerage ‘connected’.

The purchaser argued a second basis for avoiding the contract based on s 32D, the sub-section requiring disclosure of ‘notices’ affecting the land. Approximately 10 years before the subject sale and prior to the vendor becoming the owner of the property the Council had issued a permit for the installation of a septic system. The permit contained a number of conditions in relation to the ongoing inspection, maintenance and cleansing of the septic tank and was therefore claimed by the purchaser to be a ‘notice affecting the land’ that required disclosure pursuant to s 32D. Whilst there is no specific finding that these circumstances constituted a breach of s 32H at that point in the judgment where s 32H is discussed, the conclusion of the judgment refers to ‘contravention of the requirements of s 32(1), s 32D and s 32H’and so it may be concluded that failure to include the Planning Permit did in fact constitute failure to include a relevant ‘notice’.

The vendor argued that despite the conceded breach of s 32H and the contended breach of s 32D, the vendor ought to be allowed to rely on the ‘escape clause’ of s 32K and much of the judgment considers the applicability of this sub-section. The vendor bore the burden of establishing that the vendor had acted:

  • honestly; and
  • reasonably; and
  • ought fairly be excused; and
  • that the purchaser is substantially in as good a position notwithstanding the breaches.

The Court did not accept that the breach of s 32H had been caused by a ‘clerical error’ and was concerned that the vendor had not adduced evidence relating to the s 32 disclosure at the time the vendor had purchased the property some years before. Thus the ‘honestly’ burden was not satisfied.

Similar considerations militated against a conclusion that the vendor had satisfied the burden in relation to reasonableness and in the absence of honest and reasonable findings the Court was unable to conclude that the vendor ought fairly be excused.

It seemed fairly clear on the facts that a purchaser expecting a sewered property would not be in as good a position with a septic sewerage system, particularly one that carried obligations imposed by the Planning Permit.

For these reasons, the vendor’s defence failed.

The purchaser was entitled to end the contract, reclaim the deposit and claim legal costs.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Failure to correctly disclose services entitles avoidance.

A Planning Permit may constitute a notice under s 32D.

Proving all the elements of s 32K is difficult.

Retail premises

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

The meaning of ‘retail premises’ continues to occupy the attention of the Courts.

The ‘length & breadth’ of the phrase ‘retail premises’ has occupied the Courts on a number of occasions since the introduction of the original retail tenancies legislation in 1986. Indeed, this column considered some of those cases in July 2012, specifically in relation to whether the retail use of the premises was the ‘predominant use’ of the premises as required by the Act.

CB Cold Storage Pty Ltd v IMCC Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 23 decided on 7 February 2017 by Croft J is the latest of these considerations and, in some eyes, continues the widening of the application of the Retail Leases Act 2003 beyond what has been regarded by some as the traditional application of the Act.

Retail sales and services have a colloquial connection with transactions between business as a supplier and members of the public as consumers. The traditional distinction was between a retailer who sold or supplied to the public and a wholesaler who chose to service a more limited clientele and transacted with retailers who then transacted with the public. But the retail leases legislation was never this simplistic and whilst references to ‘dictionary’ meanings were occasionally made, the true meaning of the legislation was more nuanced than this.

As early as Wellington v Norwich Union Life Insurance Society Ltd [1991] VicRp 27 the Courts were considering ‘the ultimate consumer’ as the appropriate test for the application of the Act, rather than any requirement that the consumer be a member of the public. Thus that case held that the office of a patent attorney was retail premises as the business conducted therein was the provision of retail services. That the public could access those services conducted from those premises was a fact, but not a necessary component of the definition of ‘retail premises’. Reviewed in the light of the cases discussed below, the premises would have been retail premises even if the patent attorney excluded the public from the premises and only serviced qualified lawyers or, as appears to have been the case, multinational companies. To regard a multinational company as a ‘consumer’ is perhaps a challenging concept but in the context of the retail tenancy legislation it is the ‘consumption’ of the goods or services that is important, not the identity of the consumer.

Croft J referred to his decision in Fitzroy Dental Pty Ltd v Metropole Management Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] VSC 344, a case involving not the retail supply of dental services as the name might suggest but rather the supply of conference space. The tenant provided conference services, generally to business operators who might use those services for internal consumption or provide services to the public. The landlord appeared to believe that the imposition of a business between the landlord and the public meant that the premises were not ‘retail premises’ but Croft J found to the contrary and that there were, potentially, two transactions involving the retail provision of services – the provision of the premises by the landlord to the tenant and then the provision of conference facilities by the tenant to other businesses or the public. Only the first transaction was subject to the retail tenancies legislation as the second transaction did not involve the provision of retail premises, but rather the provision of retail services. It is the use of the premises as part of the supply by the tenant to the consumer that is the key to determining whether the premises are ‘retail premises’.

In the light of Fitzroy Dental it is perhaps not surprising that Croft J found that the supply by IMCC Pty Ltd of cold storage facilities to CB Cold Storage for the specific purpose of ‘cold and cool storage warehouse and transport facilities’” was the provision of retail premises within the meaning of the Retail Leases Act 2003. The tenant did not, nor was it required to, limit its use of the premises to its own business. Its business was to offer the use of the facilities to third parties, generally other businesses, ranging from large companies to small owner-operators. Whether the premises were available to or accessed by members of the public was not relevant as ‘consumers’ can be ‘persons who use a service for business or a purpose other than personal needs’.

Croft J was cognisant of the intention that the retail tenancy legislation be ‘ameliorating and remedial’ and that the intent was to provide protection to tenants who provide goods and services to ‘consumers’. The fallacy is to equate ‘consumers’ with the general public. Goods and services can be provided for consumption within the meaning of the Act irrespective of the involvement of the general public and if the tenant’s premises form part of that supply then the premises will be ‘retail premises’.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

‘Ultimate consumer’ includes both the general public and other businesses.

Any supply that involves the use of the premises by a third party is likely to be ‘retail premises’.

Deposit release – 2017

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

There has only been one reported decision on deposit release (McEwan v. Theologedis [2004] VSC 244) and that case did not consider the “condition enuring” argument. Aurumstone P/L v Yarra Bank Developments P/L [2017] VSC 503 has now considered that argument.

Section 24 Sale of Land Act provides that the deposit is to be held in stakeholding. This was designed to protect a purchaser from the possibility of the deposit being released to the vendor prior to settlement and the vendor not being able to settle, with the consequent loss to the purchaser of the deposit. However, the Act recognised that the common law had always taken the view that the vendor was entitled to the deposit upon payment and so s.27 provided a mechanism for release of the deposit prior to settlement if certain requirements are satisfied.

One such requirement is that there are “no conditions enuring” for the benefit of the purchaser. But all contacts have “conditions” that continue from the time that the contract is signed until final settlement and if the word “conditions” refers to any condition then deposit release can never occur. Such an outcome cannot have been intended by Parliament when it specifically introduced a release mechanism and so the question to be determined is what sort of condition does the prohibition refer to?

Clearly a condition allowing the purchaser to avoid the contract if a loan is not approved would be the sort of condition that would justify objection to release until satisfied, but a condition that the vendor replace a doorbell prior to settlement would not be such a condition.

The Court approached the problem of defining which conditions in the contract would be “conditions enuring” for the benefit of the purchaser by first drawing a distinction between:

  • contingent conditions; and
  • promissory conditions.

A contingent condition is a condition that does not contain a promise that the condition will be satisfied but rather defines an event or an occurrence the happening of which will mean that the contract is no longer contingent. This includes a loan approval condition that does not promise that a loan will be approved but which means that if the loan is approve then the contract is no longer contingent on loan approval.

The existence of an unsatisfied contingent condition justifies refusal to release the deposit.

Promissory conditions are in turn divided into three categories:

  • essential terms;
  • intermediate terms; and
  • warranties.

An essential term is a term that the parties intend the breach of which will lead to the right to terminate the contract.

An intermediate term gives rise to a non-essential obligation the breach of which may be sufficient to entitle termination if it goes to the root of the contract such as to deprive the injured party of such a substantial part of the benefit of the contract but will otherwise only justify a claim for damages.

A warranty, which is not an essential term, gives rise to a right to damages for breach but no right to terminate.

The relevant condition in Aurumstone was a Special Condition added to the contract by the parties to address the purchaser’s requirement that vacant possession of the property, which was subject to a lease at the time of signing the contract, would be available to the purchaser at settlement or shortly thereafter. The purchaser intended, and the vendor knew of that intention at the time of agreeing to the Special Condition, to demolish the buildings on the property and redevelop the land. The parties therefore agreed that the Special Condition was an essential term and the Court had no hesitation in rejecting the argument that s27 is limited to situations where there is no contingent condition. The existence of a promissory condition that is an essential term will justify a purchaser in refusing to consent to release of the deposit.

However, it follows that the existence of an intermediate term or a warranty may not justify refusal. An intermediate term that goes to the root of the contract may justify refusal but a lesser intermediate term or a warranty, the breach of which merely justifies damages and not avoidance, will not justify refusal to release the deposit.

The General Condition most often relied upon to justify refusal to release is GC 24, which relates to delivery of the property at settlement in the condition it was on the day of sale, fair wear and tear excepted. This is likely to be classified as an intermediate term the breach of which gives a right to damages, but not termination. The condition itself has a mechanism for calculating damages for breach and the purchaser has termination rights for substantial breach of this obligation in s.34 Sale of Land Act. It is therefore a promissory condition that is not essential and does not go to the root of the contract so it does not justify refusal to release the deposit.

It is unlikely that any other of the General Conditions that are promissory in nature justify refusal to release the deposit and so it may be concluded that it is only the contingent loan condition in GC 14, or an essential Special Condition, that justify refusal to consent to deposit release.

Tip Box

  • s.27 Sale of Land Act permits release of deposits
  • a contingent condition or essential term may justify refusal to release
  • other than GC.14, the General Conditions do not justify refusal to release.

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

 

Adjustment of rates

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Adjustment of rates can be particularly difficult for rented properties.

An essential task in a conveyancing transaction is the adjustment, between vendor and purchaser, of liability to pay rates. Whilst this task is never simple, it is even more complicated in a rental situation where the lease may transfer responsibility to pay rates and outgoings to the tenant. Additionally, the entitlement to rent needs to be apportioned.

The first inquiry is to establish who is responsible for payment of the rates pursuant to the lease.

If the landlord/vendor is responsible for payment, then adjustments are made in the normal way:

  • if the rates are paid, the purchaser will allow the prepayment to the landlord;
  • if the rates are unpaid, the purchaser will draw a cheque from the settlement proceeds in payment of the rates and adjust on a ‘rates paid’ basis. By this method the vendor pays the rates up to settlement the purchaser pays from settlement.

If the tenant is responsible for payment:

  • if the rates are paid, no adjustment is required;
  • if the rates are unpaid, the purchaser is entitled to be satisfied that any arrears of rates are paid at settlement.

This conventional way of adjusting on a ‘rates paid’ basis means that the vendor pays pre-settlement rates and the purchaser pays post-settlement rates, but both parties may take the view that they would prefer that the tenant pays.

In respect of arrears of rates, the purchaser is entitled to insist upon deduction and payment of arrears at settlement and it is no answer by the vendor to this contractual entitlement that the tenant is responsible for payment. That is a matter between landlord (the vendor) and tenant and does not reduce the purchaser’s right to adjustment.

In respect of current rates, the purchaser is entitled to adjustment up to settlement day even if the current rates are not due and payable. If adjustment is on a ‘rates paid’ basis the purchaser will effectively pre-pay the rates until the end of the current assessment. Whilst the purchaser will be entitled to recover those rates from the tenant pursuant to the lease, the purchaser might prefer to adjust on an ‘unpaid basis’ where the rates are adjusted to the day of settlement only. This requires the vendor to pay (by deduction) rates until settlement but leaves responsibility for payment of future rates to be determined in accordance with the lease.

The vendor in this situation is exposed to a loss. Pursuant to the sale contract the vendor has had to pay any arrears, including part of any unpaid current assessment by way of adjustment of the purchase price. Whilst the vendor, as landlord, had rights under the lease to recover rates from the tenant, that right passes to the purchaser at settlement – s 141 Property Law Act 1958.

The vendor therefore needs to issue recovery proceedings against the tenant before settlement, or include in the contract of sale a Special Condition addressing this situation. This might be an undertaking by the purchaser to repay to the vendor the amount of current rates deducted by the purchaser when and if, the tenant pays those rates or it might authorise the vendor to issue proceedings against the tenant in the name of the purchaser to recover unpaid rates. That the parties are entitled to contract out of the consequences of s 141 Property Law Act was established by Ashmore Developments Pty Ltd v Eaton [1992] 2 Qd R 1.

Great care needs to be exercised in drafting such a Special Condition, as is evidenced by Brinca Property Management Pty Ltd v Yeo & Rambaldi [2015] VMC 35.

Tips

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Rates are usually adjusted on a ‘rates paid’ basis.

Adjustment on a ‘paid basis’ may suit rented properties.

Vendors are exposed to loss and need consider a Special Condition.

Article – Retail Premises on adjustment of rent and dealing with Security Bonds.

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