ByLawyers News and Updates

1 January updates – All states

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1 January updates are always a big focus for By Lawyers. While the profession takes a well-earned break By Lawyers remains hard at work ensuring our publications are updated for legislative and regulatory changes that take effect from the new year.

This year’s 1 January updates for relevant jurisdictions include:

Land tax

In New South Wales and Victoria, land tax is calculated for the calendar year. Threshold values increase annually.

In New South Wales, the 2022 threshold combined land value has increased to $969,000 for all liable land. Special trusts and non-concessional companies are excepted. A marginal tax rate of 1.6% of the aggregate taxable value above the tax-free threshold, plus $100 applies from 1 January. If the aggregate taxable value exceeds the premium rate threshold of $5,925,000 then $79,396 is payable, plus a marginal tax rate of 2% over that amount.

In Victoria, the tax-free threshold for general land tax remains at $300,000. The trust surcharge threshold remains at $25,000.

All relevant commentary and precedents in the By Lawyers Conveyancing and Property and Trusts guides for each relevant state will be updated for these new threshold amounts from 1 January.

By Lawyers Contract of sale of land

The 2023 edition of the By Lawyers contract will be available 1 January in the Sale of real property publications for Victoria and New South Wales. The contract is located in the Contract folder on the matter plan.

Leases and subleases

In New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia the 2023 editions of our lease and sub-lease precedents are available from 1 January. These are found in the Leases – Act for Lessor section of each Leases publication.

Keeping up to date

In addition to our 1 January updates, By Lawyers updates our publications for 1 June and other regulated adjustments when necessary.

Of course, we also update our content for relevant legislative amendments and other legal developments throughout the year, in all jurisdictions, as required.

Keeping up to date is one of the ways By Lawyers help our subscribers enjoy practice – and holidays – more!

The team at By Lawyers wishes everyone a prosperous and safe 2023.

Retail leases – NSW

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Certain COVID-19 related arrangements for retail leases have been made permanent.

The COVID-19 and Other Legislation Amendment (Regulatory Reforms) Act 2022 No 5 preserves temporary protections for certain lessees impacted by COVID-19. This is achieved by inserting a savings provision, s 88(1A), into the Retail Leases Act 1994. This has the effect of retaining the relevant provisions of the Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2022 even though it is to be otherwise automatically repealed on 14 July 2022.

The COVID-19 protections in question include:

  • Landlords cannot act against an impacted lessee failing to pay rent, failing to pay outgoings, or not being open for business during the hours required under the lease;
  • Rents cannot be increased, except for parts of rents that are calculated based on turnover;
  • Any breaches of a lease which are caused by the tenants’ compliance with Commonwealth or State COVID-19 laws are excused;
  • An obligation on both parties to retail leases to renegotiate in good faith the rent payable under the lease, based on the economic impacts of COVID-19.

The protections reflect those of the National Code of Conduct’s leasing principles. Impacted lessees are generally those who have received government assistance during COVID-19.

The amending Act also creates a new s 89, generally empowering creation of savings or transitional regulations on leases in response to COVID-19.

The commentary in the By Lawyers Leases guide and the relevant section of the 1001 Conveyancing Answers (NSW) publication has been amended to reflect these arrangements, including links to these new sections.

Material facts

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

English and Australian common law is historically based on promoting the needs of the wealthy in preference to the poor. Consider the traditional preference to the lender over the borrower, the landlord over the tenant and the vendor over the purchaser. Hence the principle, caveat emptor – let the buyer beware.

But, the Golden Age of the consumer has been the greatest force for change in Australian law over the last 50 years and initially the courts, but more recently, Parliament have made changes to the law in all of these areas designed to promote the interests of the consumer over the wicked lender, landlord or vendor. The Consumer Credit Code in respect of lending, the Residential and Retail leasing legislation in relation to tenancy and the Vendor Statement requirements in relation to sales are three standout examples. We are getting much closer to crossing the Rubicon from caveat emptor to caveat vendor and recent changes, somewhat surreptitiously introduced, take us further down that path.

Sale of Land Act 1962 was indeed a very early example of consumer protection. The post-World War 2 rush of migration to Australia produced a vast number of people willing to work hard and make a new life. The first thing they needed was a job, of which there were plenty, and then somewhere to call home. Owning a little piece of big Australia was the migrant dream and the best way to do that was a hundred pounds down and five pounds a week. Contracts for the sale of land, or house and land, could be structured to meet the needs of this new class of property owner who, by and large, were not welcome at the door of traditional lenders. Rather than buying the property outright, by what is referred to as a ‘cash contract’, these transactions were based on payment over time, known as a ‘terms contract’. A small deposit at the beginning and small regular payments over a longer period of time, traditionally 5 years.

There was no shortage of supply for this demand. Small inner-city houses and new greenfield subdivisions serviced the need and the economy developed quickly. But there was a fundamental flaw with the application of this model on such a wide scale – no-one ever became the new owner. The title to the land remained in the name of the owner who started the chain and successive purchasers on-sold, usually taking a small profit out to apply to a ‘better’ property. By this method a chain of owners was created, with the original owner still on title and the rights of each successive owner dependent upon the due performance of the chain of contracts. As soon as one link in the chain failed, the chain broke, often with drastic consequences for the last person in the chain who, having paid their money, might lose it all.

The initial objective of the Sale of Land Act was to prevent this situation harming those at the end of the chain by outlawing successive terms contract. Thus, a purchaser on a terms contract may enter into a contract to sell the land, but only pursuant to a cash contract, not another terms contract. By this means, the title is transferred to the subsequent purchaser at the same time as the original terms purchaser completes their terms contract. This overcame the terms contract problem, but created a new problem of needing to invent a new financing model to provide a capital amount to complete the purchase contemporaneously with the contract, rather than over a number of years. Initially, this funding came by way of the second mortgage, a device designed to allow the purchaser to make up a shortfall in borrowing power by paying the vendor a part of the sale price over an extended period and eventually led to an easing of borrowing requirements and, ultimately, to the rise of Building Societies that were prepared to support borrowing for this purpose.

In the 1980s the Sale of Land Act was again the vehicle for the introduction of significant consumer protection provisions. Rarely, but occasionally, a purchaser would lose their deposit when a vendor sold a property that was subject to a substantial mortgage and the vendor took the deposit and decamped, leaving the purchaser with the vendor’s mortgage that could not be discharged for the balance due under the contract. Stakeholding of the deposit pending settlement was the solution, an admirable outcome but clumsily introduced. The more significant changes were aimed directly at the caveat emptor principle and, for the first time, introduced a vendor obligation to disclose certain information about the property prior to contract. Until this time, the vendor ranged wide and free across the property landscape. The hapless purchaser was invited to sign a contract (or even more dubious, a Contract Note or Sale Note) and then commence inquiries about the property that the purchaser was by that stage legally bound to buy. The farce of Requisitions on Title was meant to be the shield for the purchaser, but was in fact made of papier mache and the purchaser was effectively obliged to accept the property warts and all.

The vendor’s obligation to provide certain information in relation to the property prior to the purchaser entering into the contract was based on the consumer protection adage that information is knowledge and that an informed consumer is better able to make a judgment about the transaction. By and large, this has proven correct, with prospective purchasers now able to seek advice about the information provided in the Vendor Statement prior to committing to the transaction. The removal of the dubious Contract Note means that the purchaser is also more than likely now advised about the full terms of the contract, as well as the matters disclosed by the Vendor Statement.

But the vendor disclosure obligations are not a tell-all obligation. The vendor is only obliged to comply with the requirements of s 32 and, provided the vendor does that, no further disclosure is required. Austlii is littered with cases testing the extent of those obligations and various legislative fine-tuning exercises have taken place over the years. For every obligation specified in s 32, there is a question of degree or uncertainty. For instance:

  • building permits must be disclosed, but what if no building permit was obtained?
  • notices affecting the land must be disclosed, but what about notices affecting adjoining land?
  • do defects such as contamination, asbestos or structural defects need to be disclosed?

As the law stands, s 32 probably does not require the disclosure of such matters but here is the tension between caveat emptor and caveat vendor, with the above questions being answered in the negative on the basis of caveat emptor but potentially requiring disclosure if a caveat vendor principle is applied.

An amendment to s 12 Sale of Land Act that came into effect on 1 March 2020 moves this tension further in favour of a caveat vendor approach. Importantly, the new section does not create vendor disclosure obligations that directly affect the vendor-purchaser relationship, as the section creates an offence rather than directly giving rights to the purchaser, but arguably the purchaser can rely on a breach of s 12 to challenge the vendor for non-disclosure. It may have been preferrable to keep all vendor disclosure obligations within s 32, with any expansion of those obligations structured to complement the existing obligations, rather than a supplementary regime established by s 12.

Previously, s 12 created an offence for a vendor or vendor’s agent to fraudulently make a false representation in relation to the sale of land. The section had been something of a ‘lame duck’, as establishing fraud in such circumstances carried a high onus of proof. Changing ‘fraudulently’ to ‘knowingly’ arguably covers a much more expansive category of representation and GUIDELINES have been issued to illustrate the matters that may require disclosure.

Whilst breach of s 12 is an offence and does not purport to create any legal rights in favour of the purchaser, s 48A of the Act may, indirectly, do so. It has been held in Wagner v Usatov [2014] VCAT 1198 that:

Section 217 of the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (‘the 2012 Act’) creates a right of action for a person who suffers loss because of a contravention of that Act and confers upon VCAT a jurisdiction to determine any proceeding brought to pursue that right of action. So far as is presently relevant, s 217 provides:

(1) A person who suffers loss, injury or damage because of a contravention of a provision of this Act may recover the amount of the loss or damage or damages in respect of the injury by proceeding against any person who contravened the provision or was involved in the contravention.

(3) A proceeding under this section may be brought before VCAT or in any court of competent jurisdiction.

Section 48A of the Sale of Land Act is headed ‘Application of Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012’. Section 48A (1) provides:

(1) Sections 125, 195 and 196 and Part 8.2 (except section 213) of the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 extend and apply (with any necessary modifications) to this Act as if any reference in those provisions to the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 were a reference to this Act.

Section 217 of the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act is within Part 8.2.

The combined effect of those two sections is that a person who claims to have suffered loss as a result of a contravention of a provision of the Sale of Land Act 1962 may bring a proceeding at VCAT, under s 217 of the 2012 Act, to recover the amount of the loss against any person who contravened the provision of the Sale of Land Act. In other words, it is as if the words ‘this Act’ in s 217 were ‘the Sale of Land Act 1962’ instead.

This view was adopted in Han v Pirrie [2019] VCAT 1966.

In Wagner v Usatov the vendor was found to have breached s 32(2)(e) by not disclosing particulars of a planning permit and the purchaser was successful in a claim for losses said to have arisen from this breach.

Importantly, whilst Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 requires the alleged breach to have arisen in the context of a supply of an interest in real estate in trade or commerce, not such limitation applies when the vendor has breached a provision of the Sale of Land Act 1962. A ‘private’ vendor who breaches s 12 Sale of Land Act 1962 will be liable to the purchaser for any loss suffered by the purchaser because of that contravention.

Potentially, this sounds the death knell of caveat emptor in respect of the sale of real estate and crowns caveat vendor as the ruling principle. Whether that revolution should have been via a palace coup, rather than an election where the competing arguments were considered, is a matter for debate. Indeed, given the lack of fanfare, perhaps this was an accidental coup. Fine tuning and expanding the fundamental disclosure section (s 32) would have been a preferable course of action to the introduction of an entirely new and uncertain category of material facts.

Perhaps the final nail in the coffin of caveat emptor will be the imposition of a compulsory building inspection report in relation to any property (or perhaps just residential properties) that must be obtained by the vendor prior to sale and included in the Vendor Statement. This would probably add $1,000 to the cost of every proposed sale and might have the unintended effect of hosing down the property market. People would suddenly find themselves bidding for properties on a ‘warts-exposed’ basis, rather than through rose-coloured glasses.

Material Fact Guidelines

Sale of Land Act 1962

Section 12(d)

The Sale of Land Amendment Act 2019 (Amendment Act) was passed by the Victorian Parliament on 28 May 2019 and received the Royal Assent on 4 June 2019. The Amendment Act makes a number of amendments to the Sale of Land Act 1962 (the Act), including an amendment to section 12(d) of the Act.

Purpose

Section 12A of the Act (as amended) says:

The Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria may make guidelines to assist vendors of land and their agents to understand what a material fact is likely to be for the purposes of section 12(d).

A court may have regard to any guidelines made under subsection (1).

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist vendors of land and their agents (including estate agents) to understand what a material fact is likely to be under section 12(d) of the Act.

Context

Section 12(d) of the Act (as amended) provides:

Any person who, with the intention of inducing any person to buy any land—

(d) makes or publishes any statement promise or forecast which he knows to be misleading or deceptive or knowingly conceals any material facts or recklessly makes any statement or forecast which is misleading or deceptive shall be guilty of an offence against this Act…

The penalty for breaching section 12(d) of the Act is 120 penalty units or up to 12 months imprisonment.

The Amendment Act replaces the word ‘fraudulently’ with ‘knowingly’. The previous wording of section 12(d) of the Act reflected the common law tort of deceit where, although a vendor or agent is generally not required to advise a potential purchaser of any serious defects in the property of which they are aware, they cannot fraudulently (meaning, knowingly with intent to deceive) actively conceal defects. In addition, a vendor may commit the tort of deceit if they fail to answer any question about the structural soundness or quality of the property honestly and completely.

The change to section 12(d) means that it is an offence if a vendor or agent knowingly conceals a material fact about land for sale, with the intention of inducing a potential purchaser to buy the land. It is not necessary to show that anything active was done to conceal the material fact, although doing so knowingly will still be an offence. It is sufficient if a vendor or agent withholds a material fact which the vendor or agent knows to be material, with the intention of inducing a potential purchaser to buy the land.

As amended, section 12(d) of the Act supports a purchaser to make a fully informed decision before they buy land.

Commonly, some information about a property for sale may only be known to the person who has owned and/or occupied that property, and may not be known to potential purchasers even if they have personally inspected the property.

This information imbalance makes it essential for the vendor or their agent to be obliged to disclose material facts known to them to a potential purchaser of the land.

What is a material fact?

A material fact is a fact that would be important to a potential purchaser in deciding whether or not to buy any land. In the context of a proposed sale of land, a material fact is one that influences a purchaser in deciding whether or not to buy any land at all, or to buy land only at a certain price.

A fact is not innuendo, gossip or mere speculation. However, an opinion may be a ‘material fact’, if it is an expert opinion that is honestly held on reasonable grounds, and the vendor or agent have knowledge of that expert opinion.

Failure to disclose a fact alone is not sufficient to establish an offence under s 12(d). The fact must be material. A fact can be ‘material’ in two ways:

  1. Generally: a fact that an average, reasonably informed purchaser with a fair-minded understanding of the property market, including the role of an estate agent, would generally regard as material in their decision to buy land (examples are provided below).
  2. Specifically: if a fact about land is known by the vendor (or the vendor’s agent, including an estate agent) to be important to a specific purchaser, it can be material, even if other agents and consumers would not generally consider that fact to be important or of significance to them. This knowledge could arise if (for example) a particular purchaser:
  3. asks a specific question about the land of the vendor or the vendor’s agent (including their estate agent), and/or
  4. where a purchaser informs the vendor/agent of their intended use of the land.

Further indications which would be relevant to determining whether something is a material fact include:

  • whether the fact is only known by the vendor
  • the reaction of other potential purchasers to the fact, including whether knowledge of the fact may impact a potential purchaser’s willingness to buy land, and
  • whether the fact results in the property being in a rare or unusual category or position.

Vendors or agents who have knowledge of material facts cannot rely on purchasers becoming aware of them through making ‘usual inquiries’ or following the Due Diligence Checklist to avoid disclosure. General examples of material facts about land which are known to the vendor or agent but which may not be obvious to a potential purchaser include (but are not limited to) circumstances where:

  • prior tests or investigations have revealed (or the vendor or agent otherwise knows of) a defect in the structure of the building, a termite infestation, combustible cladding, asbestos (including loose-fill asbestos insulation) or contamination through prior uses of the land,
  • the underlying cause of an obvious physical defect is not readily apparent upon inspection (for example, whilst a large uncovered crack in a wall would be obvious to a purchaser upon inspection, the underlying reason for the crack, such as defective stumping, may not);
  • there has been a significant event at the property, including a flood, or a bushfire,
  • there is a history of pesticide use in the event the property had been used for horticulture or other agricultural purposes,
  • there are restrictions on vehicular access to a property that are not obvious during a property inspection (such as truck curfews or where access is via an easement that is not apparent on the Certificate of Title or plans),
  • facts about the neighbourhood surrounding the property which may not be immediately apparent upon inspection (such as sinkholes, surface subsidence, development proposals) that would likely affect the use and enjoyment of the property to a greater extent than the usual disturbances and inconveniences of occupying land of the kind and in the local area of the land being sold,
  • building work or other work done without a required building permit, planning permit or that is otherwise illegal,
  • the property during the current or previous occupation has been the scene of a serious crime or an event which may create long-term potential risks to the health and safety of occupiers of the land, such as:
    • extreme violence such as a homicide
    • use for the manufacture of substances such as methylamphetamine, or
    • a defence or fire brigade training site involving the use of hazardous materials.

There is a community expectation that homicides that have occurred at a property be disclosed to potential purchasers. Other known acts of extreme violence should be disclosed if a potential purchaser makes a specific enquiry. While these circumstances may not be a physical barrier to the use of the property, they may materially affect a purchaser’s decision to buy the land.

Defects and damage arising from prior significant events of the kind specified above, and contamination from prior uses of the land will not be considered material if they have been fully remediated, and no further repairs or other works (including ongoing work) will need to be carried out in the future. However, if a potential purchaser asks a specific question relating to defects and damage arising from prior significant events, or from contamination arising from prior uses of the land, those questions must still be answered by the vendor fully and frankly and to the best of the vendor’s knowledge.

Positive enhancements or improvements made to a property such as renovations are likely to be disclosed in the course of marketing land for sale. Positive information about land for sale, if withheld, is not of its nature the kind of information which is likely to ‘induce’ a sale.

When to disclose material facts

Estate agents (or vendors where they are not using an estate agent) should disclose all known material facts to potential purchasers as soon as they indicate that they are considering purchasing the property. They must also make continuing disclosure if further material facts become known until the property is sold.

Generally, material facts will not be concealed from purchasers if they are disclosed:

  • in marketing material or information statements; or
  • in a section 32 statement or contract of sale; or
  • on a physical inspection of the property where they are clearly visible; or
  • by specific disclosures made to particular purchasers in the course of negotiations; or
  • before the start of a public auction.

However, specific disclosure of a material fact to a particular purchaser will be required where the vendor or agent knows that the material fact has not come to the attention of the purchaser by other means.

Vendors are not required or expected to carry out tests and investigations of the property to determine if there are any unknown problems that ought to be disclosed, other than as may be required to prepare a section 32 statement.

However, if a potential purchaser asks a vendor or a vendor’s agent a question about a property, before that property is sold, the vendor or the vendor’s agent must answer that question fully and frankly and to the best of their knowledge.

If the vendor or a vendor’s agent has no knowledge of the matters raised by the potential purchaser, they can advise that potential purchaser that they do not know.

What should vendors do?

Vendors should prepare the property for inspection by potential purchasers without taking any steps to hide defects or any other important feature which would otherwise come to the attention of someone doing an inspection. They should carefully consider all information known to them or disclosed to them by their solicitor or conveyancer after having conducted the usual searches and inquiries for a section 32 statement and disclose any known material facts to their estate agent prior to the marketing of the property. Vendors should answer all inquiries about the property put to the vendor by purchasers through their agent as fully and frankly as possible.

If vendors disclose material facts to their estate agent for the purpose of answering questions asked by potential purchasers, acting reasonably and diligently, they have discharged their obligation to not knowingly conceal material facts, and the burden of disclosure of those material facts falls upon the estate agent.

If the vendor is selling the property without an estate agent, the vendor should answer all questions about the property put to them by purchasers as fully or frankly as possible in the circumstances.

What should estate agents do?

Estate agents should discuss with vendors any material facts that are likely to be the subject of statements or representations by the estate agent in the course of marketing the property. During this process, it is important for the estate agent to inspect the property, read the section 32 statement and contract and gather information from the vendor and their solicitor or conveyancer on aspects of the property which are material to the market to assist them in accurately and honestly representing the property.

The estate agent should answer all inquiries by purchasers as fully and frankly as possible in the circumstances, including by referring those inquiries back to the vendor or the vendor’s solicitor or conveyancer as necessary and diligently following up those responses.

These pro-active steps are also required of estate agents under the Estate Agent (Professional Conduct) Regulations 2018 which require an estate agent to act fairly, honestly, in good faith and in the vendor’s best interests. It is also best practice if the estate agent provides potential purchasers with a copy of the section 32 statement and contract of sale at open for inspections and via email as early as possible in the marketing campaign.

Rescission – Consequences of rescission 2

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor
First published in the Law Institute Journal

A caveator’s arguments in support of the contract upon which his caveat was based were not well received by the court in the recent case of Damco Nominees P/L v Moxham [2012] VSC 79, with the result that the contract was found to have been terminated. Consequently the caveatable interest based on the contract no longer existed and the court ordered the caveat to be removed. It could reasonably be anticipated that final orders, when formulated, would have included a costs order against the purchaser, so the exercise would have been an expensive one.

The arguments made by the caveator are reasonably common and are discussed in 1001 Conveyancing Answers – indeed, they may have sourced from that publication – so the case serves as a guide as to how the court may regard those arguments in the future.

The facts

The caveator had entered into a contract to purchase the property for $1.9m. The property was a potential residential development site and the contract gave the purchaser nearly one year to complete, with a view to allowing the purchaser to seek planning approval et cetera, a reasonably common scenario. The contract was not in the standard form commonly in use but rather was in a form specifically created by the solicitor for the vendor. Whilst not all of the terms of the contract are recited in the judgment, it is possible to conclude that the contract adopted many of the standard conditions, some with subtle changes, and added further conditions. Thus the contract included ‘general condition 40’ whereas the standard contract only has 28 general conditions.

This issue formed the first point of contention between the parties in that the caveator claimed to have signed an earlier contract in standard form and that the ‘second’ contract had only been signed one month later for the purpose of ‘cleaning up’ the ‘first’ contract. The second contract was vaguely attacked on the grounds of ‘unconscionability’ but the court gave short shrift to this argument, partly because to have accepted those arguments would have entirely undermined the caveator’s defence of the caveat as that defence was entirely based on the rights said to arise from the second contract. Thus the dispute was limited to the second, non-standard contract.

Nomination

The first indication that the purchaser might be in ‘trouble’ came two months prior to the date for settlement. The purchaser asked the vendor to give a second mortgage for 10% of the purchase price, but the vendor declined. One month prior to settlement the purchaser notified the vendor that he intended to nominate an associated company. The contract included a general condition setting out a nomination procedure involving submission of a deed and payment of a fee. The purchaser did not submit a deed in accordance with the general condition and objected to payment of the fee. Here the purchaser adopted two arguments set out in 1001 Conveyancing Answers.

The purchaser claimed not to be bound by the nomination provisions of the contract as the purchaser was nominating pursuant to its ‘common law right’. The vendor argued that no such right existed in this case as ‘the contract contained a complete code for nomination’. The point does not appear to have been argued in detail and no cases supporting the common law right are cited in the judgment, however Mukhtar AsJ was inclined to accept the vendor’s argument. However this is not authority to support the proposition that the standard form contract contains such a code. This contract was not in standard form and general condition 31 setting out the nomination procedure specifically stated ‘Nomination only under this condition’, whereas the standard contract merely provides that ‘the purchaser may nominate’.

The second attack on the nomination process in the contract related to the fee. Section 42(3) Property Law Act prohibits the imposition by a vendor on a purchaser of ‘any costs and expenses’ other than those arising from a default. The standard form contract does not provide for a fee for nomination and an attempt by a vendor to impose such a fee on the purchaser as a precondition to a nomination could be met with this s 42(3) prohibition. However this particular contract included as part of the specified nomination process an obligation by the nominee to pay the fee. By this method the vendor sidestepped the prohibition as the fee was not imposed on the purchaser. Such a fee could not be enforced by the vendor against the nominee, who is not a party to the contract, but failure by the nominee to pay the fee would give the vendor the right, as against the purchaser, to refuse the nomination.

Nomination is a common event in Victorian conveyancing. The approach of the drafters of the standard contract was to keep it as simple as possible. Therefore s 42(3) applies to the standard contract. That does not prevent individual vendors imposing a different nomination regime, as was done in this case.

Default notice

The purchaser failed to settle and the vendor issued a notice. It is fair to say that the notice was more detailed than the standard one page notice usually employed and revealed that considerable care had been taken in drafting. In addition to interest, it claimed costs on default, which were specified in the contract as $385, and costs on rescission of $1,100, including a courier fee for personal service. The notice was unsuccessfully attacked on a number of fronts:

  1. that it had been served on the nominee as well as the purchaser;
  2. that it contained an incorrect arithmetic addition resulting in an error of $310;
  3. that the notice claimed ‘proper legal costs’ rather than ‘reasonable costs’ referred to in the contract;
  4. that the $1,100 costs claimed in respect of the notice were excessive. Extensive evidence was called on this point and Mukhtar AsJ was satisfied that, in this case, that amount was a reasonable reflection of the costs arising from the purchaser’s failure to settle;
  5. that the interest claimed was calculated on the balance of purchase price plus adjustments, GST and default interest agreed to be paid in return for an extension of time. This failed as the judge held that this was the amount, however constituted, that was owed by the purchaser to the vendor at the time the notice was issued and the vendor was entitled to interest on that amount;
  6. that the termination condition in the contract incorrectly referred to the ‘buyer’s’ costs. This was rejected as an obvious error. It should have said ‘seller’s’.

The court concluded by proclaiming ‘the caveator’s claim as baseless’, having previously described the attacks on the notice as designed to ‘expose compositional errors’ and one of the letters from the solicitor for the purchaser to the solicitor for the vendor as ‘bumptious’. All in all – NOT WELL RECEIVED.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Inspection – Right to inspect

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By Russell Cocks

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Contracts for the sale of land are known as executory contracts, as there is a time delay between entering into the contract and final performance. Consequently, the condition of the property may change between contract and settlement and the contract will usually give the purchaser the right to inspect the property as settlement approaches.

The right to inspect the property prior to settlement has been General Condition 22 of the LIV. contract of sale since 2008 but is General Condition 29 of the 2019 version of that contract and provides:

The purchaser and/or another person authorised by the purchaser may inspect the property at any reasonable time during the 7 days preceding and including the settlement day.

This General Condition was the subject of close examination in the case of Mediratta v Clark [2019] VSC 685. The purchaser failed to settle and the vendor rescinded. The purchaser claimed that the vendor was not entitled to rescind as the vendor:

  • was in breach of GC 22 by refusing to permit the purchaser and/or a nominee of the purchaser to inspect the property; and
  • was in breach of an implied term by refusing to permit a valuer authorised by the purchaser to inspect the property.

The contract provided for an extended settlement period of 14 months but the purchaser, who had paid a 5% deposit, had not accepted the vendor’s invitation to complete the Duties Online form, had not submitted a Transfer (paper settlement), nor a statement of adjustments. Days from settlement the purchaser requested an extension, which was denied. In those circumstances, the vendor refused to provide the agent with keys to allow the purchaser to inspect the property.

On the day that settlement was due the agent requested keys to allow a valuer to inspect the property. The vendor refused and issued a Default & Rescission Notice alleging failure to deliver the Transfer at least 10 days before settlement (GC 6) and failure to settle (GC 28). The vendor allowed the valuer to inspect within the 14-day default period but settlement did not take place prior to the expiration of the default period and the vendor regarded the contract as terminated. The purchaser requested an inspection after the expiration of the default period, but the vendor refused on the basis that the contract had been terminated and refused subsequent attempts to arrange a settlement.

The court considered the meaning of GC 22. The purchaser argued that the condition was wide enough to allow the purchaser to nominate a valuer to inspect the property for the purpose of obtaining finance. The vendor argued that the purpose of the condition was to allow the purchaser to establish whether the property was in ‘the state commensurate with the Vendor’s contractual obligation’. Derham AsJ traced the history of GC 22 and concluded that its purpose GC 22 is to allow a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to complete the contract to inspect the property for the purpose of being satisfied as to the condition of the property. It is not available to a purchaser who is not in a position to settle on the settlement day, nor for the purpose of valuation, particularly when the contract is not subject to finance.

The purchaser’s alternative argument was that, because it was a fundamental obligation of the purchaser to pay the balance due at settlement, the contract was subject to an implied condition that the vendor would co-operate with the purchaser to allow inspection of the property by a valuer. So much had been held in earlier cases but, as Derham AsJ pointed out, those contracts were subject to finance. Whilst acknowledging that a court might imply a general duty on the vendor to co-operate with the purchaser for the purpose of allowing the purchaser to satisfy the purchaser’s obligations pursuant to the contract, such an implied condition would not be ‘open-ended’. Citing a quote from Simcevski v Dixon [2017] VSC 197 His Honour confirmed that there ‘cannot be a duty to co-operate in bringing about something which a contract does not require to happen’. This contract required the purchaser to settle, it did not require the purchaser to obtain finance. Even if a duty to co-operate by making the property available for valuation were to be implied, it ‘would be limited in time and would not enable inspection at the 12th Hour’.

The purchaser’s final argument was that the vendor’s conduct was unconscientious. This was dismissed on the basis that the vendor was entitled to refuse inspection as the purchaser was in breach of GC 6 and had failed to sign the Duties Online form.

Tip Box

•GC 22 (now 29) entitles the purchaser to a pre-settlement inspection.

•If the contract is subject to finance, the vendor must co operate.

•If not subject to finance, the vendor’s duty is limited.

Measurements

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Contracts for the sale of land often present a discrepancy between the title dimensions and the physical dimension on the ground. This problem has traditionally been dealt with by an IDENTITY condition in the contract.

Wollert Epping Developments P/L v Batten [2019] VSC 618 (Wollert) is the first case on the topic for some years and the first to consider the current standard identity clause, being General Condition 3 of the LIV/REIV contract in use between 2008 and 2019 and General Condition 7 of the LIV/REIV contract that was adopted in August 2019. As was said in Wollert, quoting from a previous judgment by Brooking J, identity clauses:

“had long been common in Victoria in contracts of sale of land under the TLA… since at least the middle of the century”.

The function of the identity clause is to chart a course between the rights of the vendor who is able to deliver title to the land and the rights of a purchaser who complains that the title does not comply with the dimensions of the land as represented by the physical boundaries, typically the fences.

The common law took a strict view in relation to dimensions and any small discrepancy entitled the purchaser to avoid the contract. Equity sought to ameliorate this harsh outcome and introduced the alternative remedy of compensation for deficiency. The standard identity clause prior to 2008 adopted this compromise by denying the right to avoid but allowing the possibility of compensation. Since 2008 the standard identity clause has denied the right to avoid and also denied a right to compensation. As explained in Wollert, by reference to an article by myself, this was justified by the fact that modern conveyancing is conducted under the auspices of s.32 Sale of Land Act and a purchaser has full details of the vendor’s title before entering into the contract and consequently has the ability to undertake a comparison of the occupational boundaries as against the title dimensions before committing to the purchase.

Wollert concerned the sale of valuable development land on the outskirts of Melbourne. The vendors were long-time farmers and the purchaser was a subdivisional developer. After signing the contract, the purchaser discovered an encroachment on one boundary. The title dimensions showed the land to be 58.1 ha. and the encroachment was approximately 500sm. or 0.92% of the area. The purchaser argued that this constituted a breach of the warranties in General Condition 2.3(c)&(e) concerning possession of the land and passing unencumbered title at settlement, and General Condition 10(1)(b) requiring delivery of vacant possession. The vendor argued that GC.3 prevailed over those warranties and that the discrepancy did not give rise to a right to avoid or claim damages.

The first point to be considered was whether the property was sold by title or sold by description. The contract referred to both the title description and the land description and if the sale was by description (rather than title) there was no misdescription as the property at the address in the contract was capable of being delivered. Wollert settled this argument by deciding that the sale was by title, not description. The second question therefore was how did the warranty conditions interact with the identity condition.

After a consideration of the law relating to identity clauses generally, Derham AsJ. concluded that the identity clause (GC.3) prevailed over the warranty conditions in circumstances where the “difference in the measurements of the land as shown in the Certificate of Title compared with the land as occupied by the Vendors is not of such consequence that it may be reasonably supposed that but for the error or misdescription the purchaser would not have entered into the Contract.” His Honour had previously referred to “the common law principle – the so-called rule in Flight v Booth, to the effect that a significant discrepancy will justify avoidance of the contract by the purchaser, and the associated ‘rule of thumb’ that a 5% or greater diminution in area is likely to be considered significant.”

It is fair to say that this judgment has settled a long-standing uncertainty in relation to measurement disputes in Victoria and has come down on the side of the identity condition adopted by the standard contract of sale. Notwithstanding the rise of consumer protection and the demand for vendor disclosure, the purchaser still bears a due diligence obligation in relation to the basic compliance between title dimensions and occupational boundaries. Only a ‘significant’ discrepancy will entitle a purchaser to avoid the contract.

Tip Box

  • Identity conditions are common in contracts for the sale of land
  • A discrepancy between title and occupation will not invalidate the sale unless significant
  • As a rule of thumb a 5% discrepancy will be significant

Avoiding off the plan contracts – A sequel

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Avoiding off the plan contracts is a common topic for this column. March 2019 and July 2018 considered sunset clauses, October 2015 looked at avoiding for quality defects and May 2015 considered the various statutory avoidance rights.

Harris v K7&@Surry Hills P/L [2019] VSC 551 is a decision of the Supreme Court that considers the purchaser’s right to terminate an off the plan contract for the sale of a residential unit and two car parking spaces. The contract was preceded by lengthy negotiations between the purchaser, the agent and the vendor as the purchaser wished to combine two of the proposed lots into one occupancy, although the contract related to 2 lots (lots 306 & 307). These lots each had a car space and a full length (as opposed to an ‘over the bonnet’) storage cage as part of each lot on the proposed plan. The contract, having identified the property sold as lots 306 & 307, included a provision that the proposed plan would be revised so as to incorporate the combined lots as one lot on the final plan.

As is often the case when purchasers seek to ‘fiddle’ with off the plan contracts, the contract ended up containing conflicting terms, some that were standard terms for the sale of lots on the plan generally and which give the vendor wide powers to amend the plan, and some that were specific to this contract that were designed to protect the changes that the purchaser had negotiated. One such specific term added to the contract as Special Condition 38 required the vendor to provide “two (2) car parks that are adjacent”.

The vendor undertook the task of revising the plan to accommodate the purchaser’s wishes, but disputes arose. In particular the revised plan only included one ‘over the bonnet’ storage cage (instead of the two full length storage cages the purchaser believed it was entitled to) and one car space on title and the right to share a car stacker for a second space. The purchaser sought assurances that the plan would be amended to provide the purchaser with 2 full length storage cages and 2 adjacent car spaces and the vendor declined to do so stating that “allocation of car spaces and storage spaces are only finalised at the time of construction completion”. It is fair to say that this is a common approach amongst developers who seek to rely on Special Conditions giving them wide ranging powers to adjust the plan of subdivision to accommodate construction needs. This case is important as it indicates that developers need to take account of specific needs of purchasers and that purchasers need to be specific in specifying those needs in the contract.

The purchaser terminated the contract on three bases:

  1. that the vendor had repudiated the contract;
  2. that there was a ‘material change’ to the plan invoking s.9AC(2) Sale of Land Act; and
  3. that the vendor had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct contrary to s.18 Australian Consumer Law.

Repudiation – the Court accepted the purchaser’s argument that by submitting an amended plan that did not include “two carparks that are adjacent” in accordance with Special Condition 38 the vendor repudiated an essential term of the contract and that the purchaser was entitled to end the contract. The vendor argued that the amended plan might not necessarily be the final plan, but the Court held that a purchaser in such circumstances is entitled to assume that an amended plan is intended to constitute a final plan.

Material change – the Court also accepted that by submitting the amended plan that did not included a full length storage cage the vendor gave the purchaser the right to terminate the contract pursuant to s.9AC(2) as that plan contained a ‘material change’.

ACL – the Purchaser’s argument based on the ACL alleged that the vendor’s agent had, immediately before contracts were exchanged and as an incentive for the purchaser to sign, represented that the purchaser would receive 2 full length storage cages and that in breach of that representation the amended plan did not include those storage cages. The plan in the contract in fact did not include 2 full length storage cages but the Court accepted that the representations had been made and rejected the argument that Special Conditions allowing the vendor wide discretion to amend the plan could be used to overcome those representations.

Developers tend to ride rough-shod over complaints made by purchasers of off the plan apartments but this case confirms that if a purchaser is prepared to see it through, the law will often provide a remedy, or three.

Tip Box

  • Specific amendments to off the plan contracts will prevail over standard conditions
  • The application of s.9AC will be judged on plans submitted from time to time
  • The ACL will provide a remedy for misrepresentation

Nomination

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal
It is common for a named purchaser under a contract of sale of land to nominate an additional or substitute purchaser. What if disputes arise between the parties to the nomination?

Such a nomination, in its simplest form, is a two-party agreement between the named purchaser and the nominated purchaser. It is a contract that exists primarily in a written form, but it may be that there are also implied conditions arising from verbal agreements between the parties or the surrounding circumstances. It is possible to make a nomination a tripartite agreement, involving the vendor as the third party, but this is unusual and a conventional nomination binds the named purchaser and the nominated purchaser but does not bind the vendor, who stands aloof from such agreements.

There is no specified form of nomination. A form in common use simply recites the parties and records that the named purchaser nominates the nominated purchaser to take a transfer of the property in the place of the named purchaser. It is important to realise that the effect of such a nomination is NOT to replace the named purchaser with the nominated purchaser in the contract. Such a substitution of the named purchaser with the nominated purchaser can only be achieved with the consent of the other party to the contract, the vendor, and would result in the named purchaser exiting the contract and the nominated purchaser becoming a party to the contract and assuming all the rights and obligation of the purchaser pursuant to the contract. In a conventional nomination environment, the named purchaser remains as a party to the contract and the nominated purchaser assumes no rights or obligations under the contract, other than being nominated to take a transfer in the place of the named purchaser.

The nominated purchaser is therefore entirely dependent upon the named purchaser for enforcement of the contract and it is unwise for the nominated purchaser to allow any reimbursement of the named purchaser’s deposit to be released to the named purchaser prior to completion of the contract. If the named purchaser receives the reimbursement of deposit prior to completion, the named purchaser may be reluctant to enforce the contract at a later stage, leaving the nominated purchaser without any ability to require the vendor to complete the contract. This is a matter that should be, but rarely is, dealt with in the written nomination agreement.

The abbreviated form of standard nomination agreements means that if a dispute arises between the parties to the nomination, a Court may be required to look behind the written agreement to determine the full extent of the rights and obligations of the parties to the nomination. Ran Bi and Sortop P/L v Yingde Investments P/L [2019] VSC 324 is a case involving just such a dispute.

The named purchaser nominated the nominated purchaser to take transfers in relation to a number of properties that the named purchaser had entered into terms contracts to acquire for land development purposes. Substantial amounts by way of deposits were due under the contracts and the named purchaser was unable to fund those deposits, thus the nominated purchaser was introduced to the project to provide funding and proceed with a development via a land holding company owned by the named purchaser and the nominated purchaser. Disputes arose between the named purchaser and the nominated purchaser after the nominations had been signed, but before final settlement. The named purchaser argued that the nomination had been terminated by the parties and was no longer effective, leaving the named purchaser as the party entitled to take the transfers.

The Court was not satisfied that the nomination had in fact been terminated and held that the nominated purchaser was entitled to be the transferee when those contracts came to settlement. The Court had no problem with the concept of the nomination being retracted, it simply found that such an outcome could only be achieved by the agreement of the two parties to the nomination and that there was no such agreement in this case.

If the parties can agree to retract a nomination, could the named purchaser make another nomination? There appears to be no reason in principle why a second nomination cannot occur. Subject to the vendor being informed of the retraction and second nomination, the vendor has no role in the process other than to comply with the purchaser’s written direction in relation to the transferee.

Some vendors insert complex nomination conditions into contracts that impose specific notification requirements and/or require payment of a fee to the vendor. Section 42(3) Property Law Act prohibits the imposition of such a fee on the purchaser, but a requirement that the nominee pays a fee is enforceable.

Tip Box

•The right to nominate is regulated by the contract

•The nominee does not become a party to the contract

•A nomination may be withdrawn and a fresh nomination made.

Working order condition

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By Russell Cocks

First published in the Law Institute Journal
A purchaser pursuant to a contract of sale of land may sometimes request that a ‘working order’ condition be added to the contract

Parties to a contract of sale of land are free to negotiate the terms of their contract and include whatever conditions they agree to. In the context of the standard contract of sale of land, such an agreement will be recorded by way of a Special Condition added to the 28 General Conditions. Such Special Conditions usually provide that all fittings, fixtures and chattels included in the sale are to be in working order as at the date of settlement. The focus of the purchaser is usually on such items as heating and cooling equipment, hot water services, swimming pool equipment and even stoves and lighting.

Because there is no General Condition applicable to this situation, the wording used often varies between contracts and the first difficulty is to determine the exact meaning and application of the Special Condition. No Court has had cause to interpret such a Special Condition, so no assistance can be gained from decided cases and as Working Order conditions are often drafted by estate agents on an ad hoc basis, interpretation is often a difficult task.

Such Special Conditions effectively seek to amend General Condition 24 of the standard contract, which provides that the vendor is obliged to deliver the property (which includes fittings & fixtures and arguably includes the chattels listed in the contract) to the purchaser at settlement in the same condition that it was in on the day of sale, fair wear and tear excepted. A Working Order Special Condition seeks to amend this general condition in two ways:

  1. General Condition 24 does NOT require the vendor to improve the property after contract, merely maintain it. Something that was not working on the day of sale does not have to be working at settlement, as it complies with General Condition 24 by being in the same condition at settlement as it was upon sale.

A Working Order Special Condition will require the vendor to improve an item that was not working on the day of sale, unless the vendor specifically excludes that item. Thus, an air conditioning unit that was not working on the day of sale must be repaired (or replaced) by the vendor prior to settlement, unless the vendor specifically excludes that unit from the Working Order Special Condition.

  1. The ‘fair wear & tear’ exception in General Condition 24 will be overridden by a Working Order Special Condition, such that the vendor will have an absolute obligation to have all aspects of the property in working order at settlement, irrespective of the cause of the deterioration. An air conditioning unit that was working at contract but stops working before settlement is an example of fair wear and tear, but under a Working Order Special Condition there is usually no provision for fair wear and tear and the vendor would be obliged to repair or replace the air conditioning unit prior to settlement.

Consequences of Breach

General Condition 24(a) provides a limited right to compensation for breach, but that right relates to a breach flowing from a failure to deliver the property in a significant sense, not the breach of a relatively insignificant provision such as a Working Order condition. (see April 2019 Property column) Therefore, the purchaser’s remedy for a breach of a Working Order condition is to rely on common law rights flowing from the breach and to sue the vendor AFTER settlement for consequential loss. There is certainly nothing in the standard contract that will allow the purchaser to refuse to settle for breach of a Working Order condition, or to claim a reduction in the purchase price. Even if the Working Order condition is framed as a warranty by the vendor, the common law remedy for breach of warranty is by way of damages to be pursued after settlement.

In those circumstances, a Working Order condition may be more trouble than it is worth. It reflects an unrealistic purchaser expectation that a second-hand property will be in an as-new condition at settlement and it simply creates disputation at the time-poor end of the transaction. Given that the purchaser’s right is limited to proceedings after settlement, the prospect of a pyrrhic victory looms large.

Conveyancing needs to be a smooth process, for both the clients and their representatives. Adding additional speedbumps to that process is not in the interest of either the clients or their representatives.

Tip Box

•Working Order conditions may be added to contracts

•Vendor may need to improve the property

•Purchaser can only sue after settlement

Nomination and the Australian Consumer Law

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By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal
Is the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) relevant to the contractual right to nominate?

This column has considered the purchaser’s right to nominate an additional or substitute transferee on a number of occasions in the past and has also considered the impact of the ACL on residential conveyancing, which is essentially a consumer transaction. This month’s column specifically considers the application of the ACL to the purchaser’s right to nominate.

Nomination

Conventionally, contracts for the sale of land in Victoria include a condition giving the purchaser the right to nominate. General Condition 18 of the Law Institute contract expresses that right in very general terms, without limitation in relation to the form of nomination or time for nomination. Parties are free to negotiate the terms of their agreement and so the parties may, by Special Condition, ‘agree’ to a more limited right to nominate, including limitations as to the nominee, time for nomination and form of nomination.

A nomination by the purchaser creates a second contract, between the purchaser and nominee, but this is NOT a contract for the sale of land, rather it is an assignment of the purchaser’s rights under the contract of sale of land to the nominee. Traditionally, this is a doc-lite contract in that the rights and obligations of the parties are succinctly recorded with no written agreement as to what is to happen if either party does not wish to proceed with the nomination. It is essentially an assignment of the purchaser’s rights to the nominee, a legal relationship recognised by s.134 Property Law Act. Consideration for this contract may be found in the release of the purchaser from obligations under the contract of sale of land and the assumption by the nominee of rights under that contract. Importantly, the vendor is NOT a party to such a nomination or assignment and the vendor remains entitled to enforce the contract against the named purchaser. The nomination acts as the purchaser’s authority to the vendor to transfer the property to the nominee in fulfillment of the vendor’s duties under the contract.

The contractual right to nominate is an important ‘escape hatch’ for a purchaser who finds that, due to changed circumstances, the purchaser is not able to complete the contract. This is particularly so in an off-the-plan environment where the contract contemplates an extended contract period during which time the purchaser is exposed to changing circumstances.

Australian Consumer Law

The ACL is designed to protect consumers. A purchaser in a residential contract of sale of land is a consumer for this purpose.

Section 20 proscribes “unconscionable conduct” which is an equitable concept developed by the Courts in cases commencing with Amadio in 1983 and which continues to develop to changing circumstances. Conduct will be unconscionable if one party to a contract is at a “special disadvantage” and the other party “takes advantage” of that situation. Some purchaser in residential contracts may satisfy this test but inequality of bargaining power alone may not be sufficient to establish unconscionable conduct.

Section 23 proscribes “unfair contract terms” in standard form consumer contracts. Factors to be considered in determining whether terms are unfair are:

  • inequality of bargaining power;
  • whether the contract is prepared in anticipation of the transaction, rather than in response to the transaction; and
  • whether the other party had a real ability to negotiate the terms.

Contracts for the sale of land are created as “standard form contracts”. Certainly, the parties are free to negotiate amendment to the terms of such contracts but, in practice, this does not happen. The vendor or vendor’s agent presents the standard form contract to the consumer and it is signed, without negotiation. Various factors: such as trust, lack of knowledge and unequal bargaining power contribute to this outcome but the result is a standard form contract in the vast majority of cases. The removal of the right to nominate, or the imposition of onerous conditions in relation to nomination, are likely to be unfair terms in these circumstances and liable to be unenforceable against the purchaser.

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