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Contract – Guarantee

1 January 2013 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Prior to the introduction of the 2008 copyright Contract of Sale of Real Estate it was common for a vendor to include a standard form guarantee in a proposed contract and to require directors of a corporate purchaser to personally guarantee the performance of the contract by signing that guarantee at the time that the contract was executed by the company.

However the copyright 2008 contract introduced a standard general condition (GC) that was designed to overcome the need for a guarantee to be included in the contract. GC 20 provides ‘The vendor may require one or more directors of the purchaser to guarantee the purchaser’s performance of this contract if the purchaser is a proprietary company’. thereby creating a right in favour of the vendor, at any time during the continuance of the contract, to require the director to sign a guarantee.

But what if, when subsequently required to enter into such a guarantee, the director refuses or fails to do so? The vendor’s rights pursuant to the contract are limited to the parties to that contract, essentially the purchaser. If the vendor is to enforce the right created by the contract, the vendor must establish a right against the directors of the company that exists outside of the contract, as the directors are not parties to the contract.

It is submitted that the vendor can successfully establish such a right based on the general principles of unconscionability, both at common law and in their statutory form. There can be no doubt that a corporate purchaser is engaging in trade and commerce when entering into a contract of sale of land and the directors, as the human force behind the company, are equally so engaged. Trade practices law has undergone considerable development in recent years with the states adopting the Australian Consumer Law, including a general duty to act in good faith.

It is submitted that a director of a company who causes the company to enter into a contract containing GC 20 will be found to be making a representation to the vendor that the director knows that the vendor is relying on the director signing a guarantee if called upon to do so and a refusal or failure to sign the guarantee will constitute unconscionable conduct and entitle the vendor to remedies directly against the director. This argument is strengthened by the High Court decision in Toll (FGCT) P/L v Alphapharm P/L [2004] HCA 52 to the effect that parties engaged in trade and commerce are taken to have read and understood the meaning and effect of contractual documents, specifically GC 20.

Corporations have no ‘life’ of their own. They are creatures of statute and are only capable of acting on the basis of the decisions made by their officers. Those decisions are to be made, in the case of multi-director companies, by the directors in formal or informal meetings of the directors. A vendor is therefore entitled to assume that a contract that, on the face of the document, is signed on behalf of a corporation has been read by the relevant officers of the corporation and that those officers are thereby aware of the terms of the contract. The directors will thereby be taken to be aware of the vendor’s entitlement to call for directors’ guarantees, and to thereafter refuse or fail to sign the guarantee when called upon to do so is unconscionable.

A disappointed vendor might also consider relying on the High Court case of Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59 where employees of an insolvent defendant were held liable for misrepresentations made by the corporation. It might be argued that by signing a contract including GC 20 the corporation is representing to the vendor that the directors will sign a guarantee when called upon to do so in the future and that the directors have accessorial liability for that representation such as to make the directors directly liable to the vendor. If the purchaser company fails to fulfil the contract the vendor may seek damages against the directors, not on the basis of a signed guarantee, but rather on the basis that the failure of the directors to sign the guarantee is a breach of the company’s representation to the vendor that the directors would sign and that the directors are personally responsible for that misrepresentation.

Alternatively, a disappointed vendor might appoint a liquidator to the insolvent company and pursue the directors who refused to sign the guarantee on the basis of the directors’ duties to the company. By authorising the company to enter into the contract the directors exposed the company to the possibility of loss. By not signing the guarantee when called upon to do so, and ultimately honouring the guarantee, the directors, in breach of their duty to the company, are responsible for the company’s loss, being the debt to the vendor arising out of the contract.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, property

Contract – Australian Consumer Law – Impact on residential conveyancing

1 January 2013 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Australian property law in general, and conveyancing in particular, were dominated for two centuries by the common law principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) which gave very little protection to a purchaser against misrepresentations by the vendor. The age of the consumer, which began with protection against encyclopedia salesmen jamming their foot in the door in the 1960s and became serious with the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act of 1974 (TPA), has been chipping away at caveat emptor for nearly 50 years and, somewhat reluctantly, the states jumped on the consumer protection bandwagon with their respective fair trading Acts.

The Australian Consumer Law (ACL) is, to some extent, the culmination of that process and seeks to provide an Australia –wide template and has been adopted by all jurisdictions to govern most of the issues that arise in a consumer protection environment. Whilst there is a nominal jurisdictional limitation of $40,000, the Australian Consumer Law applies if the transaction relates to personal, domestic or household use and there are specific provisions in the Australian Consumer Law concerned with real estate contracts.

Understanding the application of the Australian Consumer Law is not made any easier by the method used to adopt the former Trade Practices Act principles as universal legislation. The Australian Consumer Law is a Schedule of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, an Act primarily designed to establish the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and it is not until s 130 of that Act (Part XI) that reference is made to the Australian Consumer Law as being Schedule 2 of the Act. The Australian Consumer Law was adopted by Victoria as the Australian Consumer Law (Vic) by s 9 Fair Trading Act.

Whilst the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction was limited to corporations acting in trade or commerce, the Australian Consumer Law (Vic) applies to corporations and individuals ‘carrying on business within Victoria’ or ‘persons ordinarily resident’ in Victoria (s 13 Fair Trading Act).

Off the plan contracts

Such contracts have traditionally been subject to the Trade Practices Act as they invariably involve corporations engaged in ‘trade or commerce’ and the Fair Trading Act as, irrespective of the corporate character, the vendor is ‘carrying on a business’. The ACL has prohibitions relating to ‘misleading and deceptive conduct’ (Part 2-1 s 18), ‘unconscionable conduct’ (Part 2-2 s 20) and ‘false and misleading representations’ in relation to the sale of land (Part 3-1 s 30) and each of these apply if the vendor is engaged in trade or commerce, as would be the case in an off the plan contract.

The adoption of the Australian Consumer Law was not meant to be a law reform process, more in the nature of consolidation, but the opportunity was taken to expand the application of the concept of ‘unconscionable conduct’ in two respects (second reading speech). No longer is it necessary to prove a ‘special disadvantage’ and statutory unconscionability, whilst based on the ‘unwritten law’, is not limited to the existing state of the law and may be expanded by the courts.

Shortly prior to the adoption of the Australian Consumer Law, prohibitions were introduced against unfair contract terms and these were adopted by the Australian Consumer Law (Part 2-3 s 23). Whilst it is intended that these provisions will regulate the relationship between business and consumers and therefore undoubtedly apply to off the plan contracts, the section, unlike the other prohibitions, makes no mention of ‘trade or commerce’ as a precondition.

Domestic contracts

The requirement for ‘trade or commerce’ meant that the sale of a domestic residence did not create any Trade Practices Act obligations on a domestic vendor. However the unfair contract terms prohibitions in the Australian Consumer Law appear to operate whether the transaction is in trade or commerce or not, and so it may be that those prohibitions apply to contracts of sale of domestic properties.

As such sales invariably utilise a standard form contract, usually based on the 2008 prescribed contract, the general conditions of which may be saved from scrutiny by s 26(1)(c) as provisions permitted by law (the regulations), any special conditions may be subject to attack.

Conclusion

Special conditions may offend the unfair contract terms prohibitions such as giving the vendor the right not to proceed with a contract, to change the layout of the property sold or to accelerate the purchaser’s liability to pay land tax all of which may appear in various contracts, including off the plan contracts.

Additionally special conditions that specify high rates of penalty interest or potential loss in the case of default that are common in domestic contracts may offend the unfair contract terms prohibitions.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, property

Caveats – Insufficient proceeds from settlement

1 January 2013 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

The Torrens system (s 89 Transfer of Land Act 1958) allows third parties interested in land to record that interest on the title to the land by lodging a caveat. Unlike normal dealings that are registered on title, a caveat is ‘recorded’ on title. Consequently, the recording of a caveat in no way improves the status of the interest which is recorded, unlike the registration of a dealing which grants the registered interest indefeasibility.

A caveat entitles the caveator to be notified of any proposed dealing with the title and provides the caveator with the ability to establish the priority of the caveator’s interest over any competing interest by issuing proceedings within 30 days of receiving notice. But the real impact of a caveat in the world of conveyancing is the negative effect that the recording of the caveat on a title has on any transaction involving that title. Any prospective purchaser of the land, and particularly any prospective financier of a purchaser, will not proceed with the transaction if a caveat remains recorded over the title.

Thus a vendor who wants a proposed sale to proceed will be obliged by the purchaser to ‘free’ the land of the burden of the caveat by production of a withdrawal of caveat at settlement. In the normal course of events this is within the ability of a vendor, who arranges for a payment to the caveator from the settlement proceeds and a withdrawal is produced by the caveator in return. But what is the situation when the settlement proceeds are not sufficient to satisfy the caveator’s claim?

This situation often arises where the vendor is suffering mortgage stress and negotiates a sale in anticipation of receiving sufficient funds at settlement to discharge the mortgage and any other claims over the land, but finds that the effluxion of time between contract and settlement and increasing interest, costs, fees and charges result in a shortfall.

The registered mortgagee demands repayment in full, or at least the whole proceeds of sale if there is a shortfall, and there are no excess funds available to satisfy a caveator. Is the caveator obliged to nevertheless provide a withdrawal of caveat so that the settlement can proceed?

A caveator who refuses to withdraw in such a situation is entitled to argue that the caveator is merely insisting on its legal rights and should not be obliged to surrender those rights for no compensation. On the other hand, it could be argued that such a caveator is adopting a ‘dog in a manger’ attitude – if I am not going to get paid then no-one is. A party interested in having the matter proceed to settlement could issue proceedings pursuant to s 90(3) Transfer of Land Act 1958 for a declaration that a withdrawal be provided on the basis that there are no excess funds available for the caveator and the ‘balance of convenience’ favours the settlement proceeding.

There is some authority for this proposition in the New Zealand case of Pacific Homes Ltd (In Receivership) v Consolidated Joinery Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 652 where a caveat was ordered to be removed because ‘there is no practical advantage in maintaining it’. However that was in the context of a mortgagee sale and s 91(2A) Transfer of Land Act 1958 now applies in a mortgagee sale environment to defeat caveats claiming money that were lodged subsequent to the mortgage. The analogy may however still apply in respect of caveats claiming something other than money, for example, a terms contract.

There may also be some support for the proposition that the caveator should withdraw provided by the case of Capital Finance Australia Limited v O’Bryan Group P/L [2003] VSC 355. That case concerned a warrant of sale and seizure that had been lodged by a creditor and was holding up settlement of a sale that was being supervised by the mortgagee. It was clear that the proceeds of the sale would not repay registered mortgages, let alone satisfy the claim of the judgment creditor who had lodged the writ. The mortgagee successfully sought the removal of the warrant to allow the sale to proceed on the basis that there was no realistic prospect of the warrant achieving anything for the creditor and that other parties were suffering detriment from the delay.

Legal proceedings involve expenditure of substantial amounts of money in an environment that is, by definition, money-poor. An alternative is to negotiate a compromise whereby the pain is shared. The party likely to receive the biggest benefit, usually the mortgagee, might recognise that the delay and cost associated with reverting to a mortgagee sale justifies agreeing to a part payment to the caveator and the caveator might recognise that a compromise is advisable as forcing a mortgagee sale will result in automatic removal of the caveat.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, property

Caveats – Forcible removal 1

1 January 2013 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

The Torrens system (s 89 Transfer of Land Act 1958) allows third parties interested in land to record that interest on the title to the land by lodging a caveat. Unlike normal dealings that are registered on title, a caveat is ‘recorded’ on title. Consequently, the recording of a caveat in no way improves the status of the interest which is recorded, unlike the registration of a dealing which grants the registered interest indefeasibility.

A caveat entitles the caveator to be notified of any proposed dealing with the title and provides the caveator with the ability to establish the priority of the caveator’s interest over any competing interest by issuing proceedings within 30 days of receiving notice. But the real impact of a caveat in the world of conveyancing is the negative effect that the recording of the caveat on a title has on any transaction involving that title. Any prospective purchaser of the land, and particularly any prospective financier of a purchaser, will not proceed with the transaction if a caveat remains recorded over the title.

Thus a vendor who wants a proposed sale to proceed will be obliged by the purchaser to ‘free’ the land of the burden of the caveat by production of a withdrawal of caveat at settlement. In the normal course of events this is within the ability of a vendor, who arranges for a payment to the caveator from the settlement proceeds and a withdrawal is produced by the caveator in return. But what is the situation when the settlement proceeds are not sufficient to satisfy the caveator’s claim?

This situation often arises where the vendor is suffering mortgage stress and negotiates a sale in anticipation of receiving sufficient funds at settlement to discharge the mortgage and any other claims over the land, but finds that the effluxion of time between contract and settlement and increasing interest, costs, fees and charges result in a shortfall. The registered mortgagee demands repayment in full, or at least the whole proceeds of sale if there is a shortfall, and there are no excess funds available to satisfy a caveator.

Is the caveator obliged to nevertheless provide a withdrawal of caveat so that the settlement can proceed?

A caveator who refuses to withdraw in such a situation is entitled to argue that the caveator is merely insisting on its legal rights and should not be obliged to surrender those rights for no compensation. On the other hand, it could be argued that such a caveator is adopting a ‘dog in a manger’ attitude – if I am not going to get paid then no-one is. A party interested in having the matter proceed to settlement could issue proceedings pursuant to s 90(3) Transfer of Land Act 1958 for a declaration that a withdrawal be provided on the basis that there are no excess funds available for the caveator and the ‘balance of convenience’ favours the settlement proceeding.

There is some authority for this proposition in the New Zealand case of Pacific Homes Ltd (In Receivership) v Consolidated Joinery Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 652 where a caveat was ordered to be removed because ‘there is no practical advantage in maintaining it’. However that was in the context of a mortgagee sale and s 91(2A) Transfer of Land Act 1958 now applies in a mortgagee sale environment to defeat caveats claiming money that were lodged subsequent to the mortgage. The analogy may however still apply in respect of caveats claiming something other than money – for example, a terms contract.

There may also be some support for the proposition that the caveator should withdraw provided by the case of Capital Finance Australia Limited v O ’Bryan Group P/L [2003] VSC 355 . That case concerned a warrant of sale and seizure that had been lodged by a creditor and was holding up settlement of a sale that was being supervised by the mortgagee. It was clear that the proceeds of the sale would not repay registered mortgages, let alone satisfy the claim of the judgment creditor who had lodged the writ. The mortgagee successfully sought the removal of the warrant to allow the sale to proceed on the basis that there was no realistic prospect of the warrant achieving anything for the creditor and that other parties were suffering detriment from the delay.

Legal proceedings involve expenditure of substantial amounts of money in an environment that is, by definition, money-poor. An alternative is to negotiate a compromise whereby the pain is shared. The party likely to receive the biggest benefit, usually the mortgagee, might recognise that the delay and cost associated with reverting to a mortgagee sale justifies agreeing to a part payment to the caveator and the caveator might recognise that a compromise is advisable as forcing a mortgagee’s sale will result in automatic removal of the caveat.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, property

Costs and caveats

1 January 2012 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

A caveat is a document authorised by s 89 Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic.) as a means by which a person claiming an interest in the land of another person can record that interest on the title to land owned by that other person. The virtue of a caveat is that it serves to give notice to the world of the interest of the caveator and generally means that a person dealing with the registered proprietor of the land will require that the caveat be satisfied prior to completion of any transaction. A caveat is often used by a person who is owed money by the registered proprietor to provide quasi-security for that debt.

A caveat must be supported by a caveatable interest in the land and whilst a simple debt owed by the registered proprietor to a creditor will not, of itself, create a caveatable interest, a debt supported by a charging clause will do so. Thus a document that records the debt and charges the land with repayment of that debt will justify a caveat.

Lawyers perform services for clients and are entitled to charge costs for those services. Many lawyers enter into costs agreements with clients in respect of those costs and those costs agreements may include a term whereby the client charges the client’s land, or the client’s interest in the land of another, with payment of those costs: Porter & Anor v Bonarrigo [2009] VSC 500. Prudently, the costs agreement would also include a term whereby the client acknowledges that the lawyer may lodge a caveat over that land to secure payment of those costs.

There may be an argument that the lawyer in such circumstances should advise the client to seek independent legal advice in relation to the proposed charge and caveat, but that is a matter for another day.

In passing it may be noted that the caveat may be lodged against a property even if the client is only one of the registered proprietors and indeed may be lodged against the property of a person other than the client, if it can be established that the client also has an (unregistered interest) in that property, for instance, by way of a constructive trust.

Thus caveats are common in family law disputes where one party may not have access to funds but does have an interest (either registered or unregistered) in matrimonial property. However the case of Brott v Shtrambrandt [2009] VSC 467 highlights a potential problem with such caveats, particularly in the family law area. Beach J. held that lawyers’ costs agreements are, in appropriate circumstances, subject to what was then the Consumer Credit (Victoria) Code, arising out of the Consumer Credit (Victoria) Act 1995, the current equivalent of which is the National Credit Code, arising out of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth).

The code is designed to regulate consumer lender. At first glance one might wonder how a costs agreement can constitute lending, but the various definitions in the Act mean that deferral of payment of a debt constitutes the giving of credit and any agreement to secure the payment of that debt constitutes a mortgage. If the agreement includes a provision whereby ‘a charge is or may be made for providing the credit’ then the code applies. Lawyers are entitled to charge interest on unpaid accounts (Legal Profession Act 2004 s 3.4.21(4)) and a costs agreement that provides for the payment of interest will be a ‘credit contract’. A lawyer’s practice clearly satisfies the requirement that the credit be provided in the course of business and so, provided the client is a ‘natural person’ or a ‘strata corporation’ and the ‘credit’ is provided for personal purposes, the costs agreement will be subject to the National Credit Code. These two latter requirements makes the code particularly relevant in a family law environment, but it will apply to all clients who operate as a personal, as opposed to corporate, entity in other than a business environment.

A costs agreement may therefore be a ‘credit contract’ and also constitute a ‘mortgage’ under the National Credit Code. Section 44(1) of the code requires a mortgage to ‘describe or identify the property which is subject to the mortgage’ and subsection (2) provides that ‘a provision in a mortgage that charges all the property of the mortgagor is void’. Thus a provision in a costs agreement that fails to identify the charged property or seeks to charge all the property of the client will be struck down and any caveat lodged pursuant to such a costs agreement will be susceptible to challenge.

This decision later played out in Shtrambrandt & Anor v Hanscombe & Ors [2012] VSC 102. Beach J. had identified the successful legal challenge to the caveats lodged pursuant to the costs agreement independently of arguments advanced by the parties. By that stage Shtrambrandt was self-represented but he had been represented by various solicitors and barristers in the proceedings over several years and he sued those lawyers for failing to have identified this defence. After a 13-day trial in relation to this and other issues Ferguson J. decided that, given the novelty of the argument, the lawyers had not been negligent in failing to identify that defence.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, property

Subdivision – Off the plan sales – Materially affects

1 January 2012 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Many properties are sold ‘off the plan’. This is the phrase used to describe a property that is a lot on a proposed plan of subdivision, meaning that the plan of subdivision creating the lot has been drawn but it is not yet registered at the Land Titles Office.

Historically, it was not permissible to sell ‘off the plan’. Until amendments to the Sale of Land Act 1962 it was basically illegal to enter into a contract for the sale of a piece of land unless that land had its own title. Unfortunately the subdivision process can be very time consuming as the infrastructure required for the plan to get to a stage where responsible authorities are satisfied that the plan can be registered and separate titles issued is often substantial. In the case of land subdivision, this involves the provision of roads and services; and, in the case of building subdivision, it involves construction of the building. However the market consisted of vendors who were keen to secure purchasers for these separate lots and purchasers who were keen to secure their ‘little piece of heaven’ and so the restriction on sale that was a dampener on economic activity was eased.

However, in recognition that such contracts generally involve a developer and a consumer and therefore are conducted in an uneven bargaining environment, some restrictions still apply to such sales. These restrictions also recognise that there is likely to be a substantial delay between contract and settlement. Indeed, this very month, an obligation to include a conspicuous Notice to that effect in every off the plan contract has come into force. Other statutory provisions relating to such sale include limitation on the amount of the deposit and an obligation that it be held on trust, an obligation to include information about land surface works, a default period for registration (sunset clause) after which time the purchaser may avoid the contract and protection against changes to the proposed plan. These obligations require the inclusion of various provisions in the contract and these are included in the General Conditions.

Despite the fact that off the plan sales form a substantial part of the market, there have been relatively few decisions that have considered the meaning of these statutory protections. In the apartment market, there were some proceedings involving dissatisfied purchasers in the early days of the Docklands project, but those complaints tended to relate to price rather than off the plan issues. In the land subdivision market, the lack of cases probably reflects the fact that it is just too expensive for John Citizen to consider taking a land developer to Court in relation to such matters.

In recent years off the plan sales have become popular in an area that is something of a combination of the other two areas. Urban renewal and infill housing has created a market for small land subdivisions that involve the subdivider either constructing a home on the subdivided land or arranging for that construction. This scenario produced the recent case of Joseph Street P/L v Tan [2012] VSCA 113 discussed in the September 2012 column and has now produced Besser v Alma Homes P/L [2012] VSC 460.

This case involved a 4 lot plan of subdivision of a large block on a main road in Caulfield and the purchaser entered into an off the plan contract for a ‘front’ unit for $1,250,000. The contract included a copy of the proposed plan of subdivision which included a plan showing a common driveway between the two front blocks giving road access for the two rear units and revealed that an owners corporation would be created with each unit having a 25% entitlement and liability. After registration of the plan the purchaser became aware that the lot entitlement and liability had changed so that each front unit had an entitlement and liability of 1 out of 202 – less than 0.5%. This unilateral decision by the developer had apparently been made on the basis that the front units would not use the common property and, on a liability basis, could be seen to advantage the front units.

However this proposal had not been communicated to the purchaser, who took the view that the change amounted to “an amendment to the plan of subdivision which will materially affect the lot” thereby entitling the purchaser to avoid the contract pursuant to s 9AC of the Sale of Land Act 1962. The vendor argued that the change to the lot entitlement and liability schedule was not a change to the plan, but that argument was rejected. Similarly, the vendor’s argument that the amendment did not “materially affect” the lot was, not surprisingly, rejected. Pagone J. alluded to the loss of voting rights consequent upon the amendment, but the affect on insurance entitlement in the case of a combined building policy would also be a powerful reason to find material affectation.

Interestingly, the fact that the notification of the amendment and the purchaser’s avoidance was made after registration of the plan was not an issue. Section 9AC(1) does include the words ‘before the registration of the plan’ but presumably the vendor accepted that as notification came after registration of the plan, an attempt to limit the purchaser’s avoidance right to prior to registration would be doomed to fail. The interaction between s 9AC and s 10, which also creates an avoidance right but is limited to exercise prior to registration, is uncertain and legislative clarification of the purchaser’s rights in this regard is needed.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, purchase, sale

Subdivision – Off the plan sales – Best endeavours – Part 2

1 January 2012 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

The April 2011 column considered the case of Joseph Street Pty Ltd v Tan, a decision at first instance reported at [2010] VSC 586. The case has now been reversed on appeal, reported at [2012] VSCA 113.

The effect of the Court of Appeal decision would appear to make the entering into of a s 173 Planning and Environment Act 1987 Agreement compulsory for developers in all circumstances where the municipal council is prepared to enter into such an Agreement.

The case involved a ‘villa unit’ style development of 6 single storey units in Box Hill. Units were sold off the plan with settlement to be after registration of the plan in accordance with common practice. The builder that the developer had contracted to undertake construction failed to do so and the developer was forced to find another builder. As a result, construction was not completed within the time allowed by the contract for registration of the plan (the sunset period) and the developer rescinded the contract.

The purchaser refused to accept rescission and sued for specific performance of the contract on the basis that the vendor had failed to use ‘best endeavours’ to have the plan registered. It had been established at first instance that this obligation consisted of both an express contractual obligation and also as an implied obligation.

The Full Court identified that registration of the plan could only be achieved when the council had issued a Certificate of Compliance, but that there were two methods by which the developer could obtain that Certificate and thus fulfil the contractual obligation to secure registration of the plan:

  1. the developer could complete all the building works to the satisfaction of all relevant service authorities; or
  2. the developer could enter into a s 173 Agreement with Council after entering into agreements with service providers.

Evidence given on behalf of the developer suggested that the s 173 Agreement option was limited to ‘greenfield’ developments and had not been contemplated by the developer as an option. However evidence from the council suggested that s 173 Agreements were common in ‘smaller’ developments and indeed the planning permit issued in respect of the development had referred to the possibility of just such an Agreement.

The effect of the s 173 Agreement is to give the council the ability to register on the ‘parent’ title (the title to the unsubdivided land) the requirement that the development be constructed in accordance with the planning permit issued in respect of the development. If council has the benefit of such an Agreement then, subject to the satisfaction of other relevant authorities, council is able to be satisfied that the development will be built in accordance with the permit and council’s planning responsibility in relation to supervision of construction is thereby satisfied. If construction is not in accordance with the permit, council is entitled to enforce the s 173 Agreement against the developer and all subsequent registered owners.

The s 173 Agreement process appears to be a shortcut to registration of the plan, as a certificate of compliance may be issued by council well in advance of completion of all construction and infrastructure works. The requirement that the developer enter into satisfactory agreements with infrastructure providers is a pre-condition to a s 173 Agreement and such arrangements may be tedious to negotiate, but once achieved registration of the plan can quickly follow.

This might cause concern for a purchaser if the only requirement on the vendor is registration of the plan. As can be seen from the above, this could be achieved well before construction is complete, but no purchaser is going to want to pay for a half finished property. Thus a purchaser needs to be satisfied that settlement will only be due after both registration of the plan and issue of a certificate of occupancy. Whilst there is much to be said against a certificate of occupancy being a true reflection that all works have been completed, it is at least an objective confirmation that most works have been completed. A better test is a satisfactory report from the purchaser’s building consultant, but few developers are prepared to countenance such a hurdle.

Whilst the Court of Appeal in Joseph Street may have identified a shortcut that was open to the developer, it is interesting to note that the developer was not aware of that possibility and there is no suggestion that the purchaser ever suggested to the developer that such a process was available, let alone that the developer refused to follow that course. Apparently, the mere fact that the option was available and not taken was enough to satisfy the Court that the developer had failed to use his best endeavours. A true case of ignorance is no excuse.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, purchase, sale, subdivision

Lawyers selling real estate

1 January 2012 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

Legal practitioners are licensed to provide legal advice. Estate agents are licensed to sell real estate. Both professions operate, in part, in the real estate industry and at times the distinction between their respective roles may become blurred. Indeed, the 1990s saw a push in Victoria for lawyers to take a more active role in the industry, along the lines of the Scottish model where lawyers are actively involved in the marketing of real estate. This desire to broaden their area of influence may well have been a response by lawyers to the perceived contraction of their work base resulting from the rise of conveyancers. The fact that an agent’s commission will usually be between 10 and 20 times the average legal bill for a transaction might also have played some part.

A lawyer wishing to gain an estate agent’s licence could reasonably expect to be able to satisfy the various formality requirements and so it is possible to hold both a licence to practice law and a licence to sell real estate. Not many lawyers choose to do so, but it is possible. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most lawyers prefer to practice in an environment that recognises the different skills associated with the provision of legal advice, as opposed to the marketing skills associated with a sales environment. This may be described as a collaborative method of practice, with the lawyer developing a working relationship with one or more estate agents designed to deliver the two separate skill sets to the client from two distinct sources. However this method of practice is susceptible to allegations of conflict of interest and the lawyer must take care to ensure that the client is aware that the lawyer’s loyalties lie with the client, notwithstanding a close working relationship between lawyer and agent. The dark side of this collaborative model is inappropriate referral by one participant to the other, sometimes involving payment for that referral, but such situations are rare.

However a lawyer might also be involved in the sale of real estate on behalf of a client without holding an estate agent’s licence. Section 5(2)(e) Estate Agents Act 1980 recognises an exception to the obligation to hold an estate agent’s licence for:

Any Australian legal practitioner (within the meaning of the Legal Profession Act 2004) for the purpose only of carrying out the ordinary functions of an Australian legal practitioner.

The breadth of this exception was tested in Noone v Mericka & Ors [2012] VSC 101.

Peter Mericka is an Australian legal practitioner and has for a number of years conducted a legal practice known as Lawyers Real Estate. This practice ‘combined’ the role of lawyer and real estate agent and offered vendors a ‘one-stop shop’ with a fixed fee for both the sale of the vendor’s property and the legal work associated with that sale. This is akin to the Scottish model and the costs for this ‘combined’ service were more than a lawyer’s standard conveyancing fee but considerably less than a standard estate agent’s commission. Mericka gained an estate agent’s licence in 2010 but had conducted his business prior to that time on the basis of the exception in s 5(2)(e). This drew the attention of Consumer Affairs Victoria, which is the regulatory authority pursuant to the Estate Agents Act, and alleged that Mericka had contravened the Act by selling real estate without holding an estate agent’s licence.

Sifris J. concluded that whilst the ordinary functions of an Australian legal practitioner might include the selling of real estate on behalf of a client ‘where it is required or is incidental to the provision of legal services to a particular client’ the activities of Mericka did not come within the exception. These activities involved ‘ongoing and systematic marketing and advertising in connection with the sale of clients’ properties’. It was the repetitive nature of the services offered which lead to the conclusion that the activities took the work outside of the ‘ordinary functions’ of a lawyer. Indeed the judge described this work as ‘engaging in the business of a real estate agent’.

The consequence was that Mericka had contravened the Estate Agents Act for that period of time during which he was unlicensed and had also engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by advertising that he was entitled to sell real estate on behalf of clients without having an estate agent’s licence. Imposition of a penalty was adjourned to another day.

Sifris J. also decided that the exception could never apply to an incorporated legal practice as it is limited to an Australian legal practitioner and this, by definition, must be an individual, albeit an individual practising alone or in partnership. This anomaly should be addressed as there is no reason why a practitioner who has adopted the perfectly acceptable practising method of utilising an incorporated legal practice should be discriminated against. The same may be said for a practitioner practising in a multidisciplinary practice, another mode of practice recognised by the Legal Profession Act. Indeed the motivation for establishing a multidisciplinary practice is to encourage lawyers to expand their areas of practice into ‘nontraditional’ areas, and a multidisciplinary practice that involved the occasional sale of client’s property is a logical area for expansion.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, property, purchase, sale

Retail lease – Predominant use

1 January 2012 by By Lawyers

Predominant Use

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor
First published in the Law Institute Journal

Section 4(1)(a) of the Retail Leases Act 2003 provides that the Act applies to premises:

wholly or predominantly for –

  1. the sale or hire of goods by retail or the retail provision of services

The Act was designed to protect retail tenants, specifically tenants of large shopping complexes where there was a perception of disproportionate bargaining power. However the Act is not limited to large complexes, although some of the provisions apply to a ‘retail shopping centre’, which is defined as five premises owned by the one landlord, and additional restrictions apply to such premises.

As the Act applies to retail premises generally, it may apply to shops and offices in strip shopping centres and even to stand alone premises in residential or industrial areas that have a retail use. Thus a solicitor who provides services to the public from a suburban office and a panel beater in an industrial estate may be entitled to the benefit of the protections provided by the Act.

It is important to understand that it is the use of the particular premises that determines the applicability of the Act, not the character of the tenant. Thus a solicitor is no doubt engaging in retail services and the solicitor’s office will be subject to the Act, but a separate storage facility rented by the solicitor as part of the legal practice will not be covered by the Act as those premises are not used for the provision of retail services to the public.

This distinction between retail and non-retail premises is simple when separate premises are used, but the distinction is less clear when the same premises are used for both retail and non-retail purposes. Such a situation might arise, for instance, where a business rents a large warehouse facility to manufacture furniture but also has a ‘front of house’ retail sales component. Determining whether the premises are ‘retail’ will depend upon whether the ‘predominant use’ of premises is retail and two obvious tests for determining the predominant use in such a situation are the comparative area occupied by the various uses and the proportion of income derived by each use. In the present example it is likely that the manufacturing facility would occupy the majority of the area and the income derived from retail sales would be a small proportion of total income and thus the predominant use is manufacturing, and so the Act will not apply.

The dictionary meaning of ‘predominant’ is ‘greatest’ or ‘most important, powerful or influential’. However the question is not so much what is ‘predominant’ but rather ‘predominant’ what? Consideration of whether the retail component of the business occupies the ‘greatest’ amount of the area of the premises or generates the ‘greatest’ proportion of income would appear to be relevant tests, but they are not the only factors to be taken account: see Elmer v Minute Wit Enterprises P/L [2002] VCAT 1101.

That case concerned a shop in a strip shopping centre that was rented by a tenant who sold antique furniture, a scenario that would ordinarily be retail premises. However the tenant’s principal business was conducted from nearby premises and the shop was used only for display and storage, only being opened when an inquiry was directed to the principal place of business. This, in addition to other reasons, justified a finding that the premises were not retail premises within the meaning of the Act and introduced a ‘time’ test into the mix.

A similar ‘time’ test was adopted in Evans & Ors v Thurau P/L [2011] VCC 1354. The subject property was an apartment in a ski lodge which was subject to a requirement in the head lease that the apartment be available for rental through the head tenant to members of the public when not in use by the subtenant. It was argued that this meant that the property was ‘holiday accommodation’ and therefore ‘retail premises’ and that the dispute should therefore be before VCAT. Judge Anderson concluded that the fact that the snow season was limited and that the subtenant could, if they choose, occupy the premises for the whole of that season to the exclusion of the public meant that the predominant use was not retail. The fact that a retail use was one of the possible uses was not enough.

It can been seen from these cases that the determination of whether the ‘predominant use’ of premises is retail will depend upon a number of possible factors, some or all of which may play a greater or lesser role in the determination in each case. Apart from what the lease itself may provide, the courts may consider the area occupied by the retail component, the income earned by that component and the time that the retail component is utilised.

It will be interesting to see how these factors will come into play when an inevitable question comes up for determination. That will be a dispute arising from premises used for retail sales conducted entirely by phone, fax or internet, a typical call centre environment. Such premises do not include physical access to the premises by members of the public, but certainly involve retail sales. No doubt one party will argue that public access is an integral part of retail sales within the meaning of the Act, an argument that appears to have some merit when the purposes of the Act are considered.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, leases, property, Retail Lease

Co-owners and easements – Two topics

1 January 2012 by By Lawyers

By Russell Cocks, Solicitor

First published in the Law Institute Journal

This column is concerned with two cases on entirely different topics, but connected by a similarity in the name of the principal parties and the fact that they are recent decisions in the Real Property List of VCAT, a jurisdiction that is growing in importance for property lawyers. Pavlovic v GEADSI Nominees P/L [2012] VCAT 997 (Pavlovic) concerns an easement and Pavlovich v Pavlovich [2012] VCAT 869 (Pavlovich) concerns co-ownership.

Pavlovic took place in a fairly conventional inner suburban setting. The two protagonists were neighbours, with Pavlovic having purchased his property in recent years with the intention of renovating and living in the property and GEADSI having constructed three units on the adjoining property some 15 years previously. At that time GEASDI had obtained from the then owner of the Pavlovic property consent to construct a stormwater drain across the Pavlovic property and a stormwater pipe had been constructed such as to take the stormwater from the GEADSI land through the Pavlovic land and to a laneway at the rear. This pipe was below the surface of the ground and Pavlovic was not aware of the pipe when he purchased the property as it was not recorded as an easement on the title, not evident to a physical inspection and he was not otherwise been informed of its existence.

Pavlovic intended to construct improvements in the backyard and discovered that the soil was so saturated that it would be necessary to remove the soil at a cost of $15,550 before commencing construction. Additionally, it would be necessary relocate the pipe to prevent the ongoing saturation of the soil below the improvements. Pavlovic wanted the pipe removed. He commenced these proceedings for an order pursuant to s 16 Water Act 1989.

GEADSI argued that the pipe constituted an implied easement and that Pavlovic, as subsequent purchaser, was bound by that easement. The Tribunal rejected that argument, effectively finding that the consent given by the previous owner did not create a proprietary right and was not enforceable against subsequent owners. An argument based on a prescriptive easement was rejected on the basis that the right to use the pipe arose by consent. The recent case of Kitching v Phillips [2011] WASCA 19 was referred to. Effectively, the Tribunal was of the view that the original temporary solution to the drainage problem should not be allowed to impact on the proprietary rights of the new owner – a glowing endorsement of fundamental Torrens principles. GEADSI was ordered to pay the costs of removing the saturated soil and to remove the pipe.

Pavlovich on the other hand concerned an application by a co-owner pursuant to the ‘partition provisions’ of the Property Law Act 1958, specifically s 228. The parties to the proceedings were registered joint tenants and, unusually, the application was not for a ‘partition’ as that word is generally understood but rather a transfer from one co-owning joint tenant to the other joint tenant. Whether VCAT had power to do so occupied the first portion of the judgement, with a conclusion that the power conferred by s 228 did indeed authorise such a transfer.

The parties were mother and son. There was evidence that as part of a downsizing exercise the mother had purchased a property but was unable to gain temporary finance, so the son was added as a joint tenant. Shortly after, the loan was repaid from the proceeds of sale of the mother’s original property and so the subject property was owned as joint tenants, although the son had effectively made no financial contribution.

Ten years later the mother applied for an order that the son transfer his interest in the property to the mother. The mother argued that it had always been intended that the son would do so when the loan was repaid. The son argued that it had been agreed at the time that the son would remain as joint tenant and then ‘inherit’ the property upon his mother’s death as gifts were made to other siblings that would be ‘offset’ by the son taking the property. Essentially the issue was a factual one and the Tribunal accepted the mother’s version.

The Tribunal concluded that whilst the son was a legal joint tenant, beneficial ownership resided entirely with the mother, therefore the son was ordered to transfer his interest in the property to the mother so that she would become sole legal and beneficial owner. Concern was raised, but dismissed, that because the Tribunal was therefore finding that the son had no beneficial interest, he could not be a co-owner within the meaning if the Act and VCAT therefore had no jurisdiction.

This is similar to an argument raised in Garnett v Jessop [2012] VCAT 156. Jessop was the sole registered proprietor and Garnett sought partition on the basis that he had made contributions and therefore held an equitable interest on the basis of a constructive trust. VCAT dismissed a submission that only legal (registered) owners qualify as ‘co-owners’ within the meaning of the Act and held that a party claiming an equitable interest is a ‘co- owner’ and therefore entitled to seek partition.

Tip Box

Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.

Filed Under: Articles, Conveyancing and Property, Victoria Tagged With: conveyancing, Conveyancing & Property, property

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