This publication has been updated as the result of an extensive author review, including new content discussing the recent changes introduced by the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016.
For corporate insolvency up to date case law examples have been included.
Enhanced content on how bankruptcy proceedings are regulated in Australia and the role of creditors.
Bankruptcy and Liquidation
NOVEMBER
- Further Information – added more links
- Costs Agreements – reference to interstate costs laws added and updated interest clause
OCTOBER
- New article – Trading whilst insolvent
- Costs Agreements
- Disputes section improved, fields for client and firm details added, trust account details added, solicitor’s lien added, execution clauses for individuals and corporations added and general formatting
- VIC/NSW – Included reference to time limit for bringing costs assessment, total estimate of legal costs section with provision for variables, and authority to receive money into trust.
- WA – Added clause on scale fees.
AUGUST
- Costs Agreements added for Tasmania and Northern Territory.
APRIL
- File Cover Sheets for all publications have been completely re-formatted for a better look.
FEBRUARY
- Making life a little easier for practitioners – look out for Blank Deed, Agreement and Execution Clauses folder in the matter plan at the end of each Getting the Matter Underway.
Trading whilst insolvent
By O’Brien Palmer
What is insolvent trading
Directors have many duties, one of which is to prevent their company from trading whilst insolvent. Pursuant to s 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act), a director breaches that duty if they cause the company to incur a debt in circumstances where they knew, or ought to have known, that the company is insolvent, or likely to become insolvent as a result of that transaction. If proven, directors can be charged, fined and/or become personally liable for the debts incurred by the company whilst it was insolvent.
What is solvency
Definitions
Section 95A of the Act states:
- A person is solvent if, and only if, the person is able to pay all the person’s debts, as and when they become due and payable.
- A person who is not solvent is insolvent.
Unfortunately, the usefulness of these definitions is limited except to the extent that the wording of the legislation recognises cash availability as the primary determination of solvency. For further guidance it is necessary to refer to case law.
Assessing a company’s solvency
The importance of cash flow in determining solvency was articulated by his Honour Dodds-Streeton J in his judgment in the matter of Crema Pty Ltd v Land Mark Property Developments Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 338, where he stated that:
Section 95A of the Act enshrines the cash flow test of insolvency which, in contrast to a balance sheet test, focuses on liquidity and the viability of the business. While an excess of assets over liabilities will satisfy a balance sheet test, if the assets are not readily realisable so as to permit the payment of all debts as they fall due, the company will not be solvent. Conversely, it may be able to pay its debts as they fall due, despite a deficiency of assets.
The assessment of the solvency of a company requires an analysis of the totality of the company’s circumstances, including industry norms and available credit. This firm was involved in an often reported case known as Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) & Anor v The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2001] NSWSC 621. In his judgment, His Honour Palmer J. stated that the following propositions could be drawn from the established authorities:
- A company’s solvency is a question of fact to be ascertained from considering its financial position as a whole.
- In considering a company’s financial position as a whole, the Court must have regard to relevant commercial realities, such as what resources are available to a company to meet its liabilities as they fall due.
- In assessing whether a company’s position as a whole reveals surmountable temporary illiquidity or insurmountable endemic illiquidity, it is proper to have regard to the commercial reality that creditors will not always insist on payment strictly in accordance with their terms of trade but that does not constitute a cash or credit resource available to the company.
- The commercial reality that creditors will normally allow some latitude for payment of their debts does not warrant a conclusion that the debts are not payable at the contracted time.
- In assessing solvency, the Court acts upon the basis that a contract debt is payable at the time stipulated for payment in the contract.
These propositions, whilst informative, are somewhat broad. A further and useful commentary on solvency was given by his Honour Mandie J in a judgment delivered in the high profile case of ASIC v Plymin & Anor [2003] VSC 123 (otherwise known as the Waterwheel Case). Justice Mandie adopted 14 indicia of insolvency which are now often utilised in assessing the solvency of a company. However, this list is not exhaustive. The Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) has published a guide on the warning signs of insolvency. You are also referred to a newsletter previously issued by O’Brien Palmer entitled Practical warning signs of insolvency for small business.
Temporary or endemic cash flow insolvency
A company is insolvent where the available resources are insufficient to meet the debts that are due and payable at that specific point in time. These resources do not necessarily have to be assets of the company, which is why the balance sheet can be irrelevant to the assessment of solvency. The ability of a company to draw on available credit resources is also relevant to any determination of solvency.
It is relevant to distinguish between a company that is insolvent and a company that is experiencing temporary cash flow issues. In the judgment of his Honour Jacobs J in the matter of Hymix Concrete Pty Ltd v Garrity (1977) 13 ALR 321, it was acknowledged that:
…a temporary lack of liquidity is to be distinguished from an endemic shortage of working capital where liquidity can only be restored by a successful outcome of business ventures in which the existing working capital has been deployed.
An endemic shortage of working capital will be apparent where the company is utilising credit funds on terms that it cannot comply with or at debt levels beyond that which it can service. It would also be evident in circumstances where a company is otherwise displaying numerous signs of insolvency.
How a liquidator proves insolvency
Steps to prove the date of insolvency
In order to determine the date on which a company is deemed to have become insolvent, an insolvency practitioner will review the available books and records of a company, as well as records obtained from third party sources such as creditors, banks and statutory authorities. In conducting this review, the practitioner is looking for evidence of indicia of insolvency. The key indicia of insolvency include the following:
- overdue trade creditors;
- overdue taxation liabilities;
- recovery action being initiated by creditors;
- no access to alternate finance;
- Payment of debts by way of instalments.
As a result of this review, it can become apparent that at a certain point in time, sufficient indicia of insolvency are present to justify a conclusion that the company was insolvent at that time.
Section 588E(3) of the Act provides that where the evidence supports a determination that a company became insolvent at a time within 12 months prior the company being wound up, it is presumed that the company was insolvent throughout the period between that time and the date that the company is wound up.
If the company has not maintained adequate books and records in compliance with s 286 of the Act, then a presumption of insolvency arises for the period in which the books and records have not been properly maintained. Section 588E(4) of the Act states that if a company does not keep comprehensive and correct records of its accounts and financial position, or if it does not keep records of a transaction for seven years after its completion, then that company will be presumed to be insolvent during the period to which the records relate.
Not only is the inability to maintain financial records an indicator of insolvency, but failure to maintain proper books and records may render a company legally insolvent from a date which is earlier than it actually became insolvent.
Debts incurred
After a date of insolvency is established, the liquidator will then assess the debts incurred after that date, in order to determine the quantum of the personal liability of a director for trading whilst insolvent.
Claim for trading whilst insolvent
Where it is determined that a company has traded whilst insolvent, then an insolvency practitioner will in the ordinary course report this alleged contravention to ASIC in accordance with either ss 422, 438D or 533 of the Act.
A liquidator appointed may also take steps to seek compensation from the director(s) for the quantum of the debts incurred by the company after it became insolvent. These steps usually involve the issuance of a letter of demand to the director(s) for repayment of a fixed sum of money. The liquidator may also instruct a solicitor to further pursue the claim where the initial demand is ignored or commercial settlement cannot be reached. The liquidator may be required to commence proceedings against the director(s) to seek compensation orders.
In circumstances where there are multiple directors, the liquidator is entitled to recover from whichever of the directors is most commercial to pursue. That director has a right of indemnity against their fellow directors to recover an equitable share of the amount recovered by the liquidator.
Defences available to directors
Directors may have defences to a claim made for insolvent trading. Section 588H of the Act states that a director can claim a defence where he or she:
- had reasonable grounds to believe that the company was solvent at the time it incurred the debt, and that it would remain solvent even after incurring the debt;
- can prove that the person in charge of providing accurate information concerning the company’s financial status and solvency was performing this task, and led the director to believe that the company was solvent and would remain to be so even after incurring the debt;
- had good reasons not to be involved in the management of the company when it incurred the new debt, such as a result of a serious illness;
- can prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the company from incurring the debt.
Consequences of insolvent trading
A director who has been charged with insolvent trading faces several consequences.
Civil penalties
Company directors may face fines of up to $200,000 in circumstances where their breach was not dishonest.
Criminal penalties
If trading whilst insolvent is proven to be of a dishonest nature, then directors can face criminal convictions for this breach. A criminal charge carries a maximum penalty of $220,000 and five years imprisonment. A person may also be disqualified from managing corporations.
Compensation orders
If a liquidator suspects a person may have breached their duty in preventing the company from trading whilst insolvent, then he or she, a creditor, or ASIC can take action against the director pursuant to s 588M of the Act. A Court may order that the director repay the company to the value of the debts incurred from trading whilst insolvent.
It should be noted that a creditor can only take this action with the permission of the liquidator or leave of the court, and may only pursue the director for the value of its debt.
Holding company liability
Section 588V of the Act provides that a holding company may be liable for the insolvent trading of its subsidiary in circumstances where the directors of the holding company were aware, or should have been aware, of the insolvency of the subsidiary company.
The impact of repayment arrangements on solvency
Smith v Boné, in the matter of ACN 002 864 002 Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] FCA 319
Background
Mr Barry Boné was the sole company director of Petrolink Pty Ltd (Petrolink). In December 2011, Mr Smith was appointed as liquidator of the company.
The liquidator brought an action against the director seeking compensation for insolvent trading pursuant to s 588G of the Act for the losses suffered by Petrolink’s creditors.
In this dispute, the liquidator claimed that Petrolink was insolvent from 30 June 2009 until the date on which the winding up commenced and that Petrolink continued to trade and incur debt throughout this period. However, the director argued that his company was only insolvent from July 2011.
Relevant to the outcome of the case was the fact that Petrolink had entered into a payment arrangement with the Australian Tax Office (ATO), its main creditor, in order to discharge its outstanding debts.
The director’s defence
The director argued that any reasonable person would have believed that the company was solvent based on the payment arrangement he had established with ATO, which he argued deferred the debts of the company such that they were no longer due and payable. He also stated the company was generating significant revenue throughout the period.
The ruling
His Honour, Gleeson J, found that any reasonable person in the position of the director would have grounds to believe that the company was insolvent and that despite the revenue being generated by the company, its debts remained unpaid. In regard to the payment arrangement, the Court found that the payment arrangements negotiated with the ATO did not have a material effect on the solvency of Petrolink because of the shortness of their duration and the fact that none of them had the effect that Petrolink was not required to pay its outstanding tax liability imminently. The payment arrangements in fact demonstrated that Petrolink was continuing to experience common features of insolvency.
Ultimately, His Honour determined that Petrolink was insolvent from 12 May 2010 and the director was found to be liable to the liquidator for an amount of $669,582.86.
In addition, while the Court did not find that the director had acted or conducted himself dishonestly, it did not exempt him from being held personally liable for insolvent trading. The Court ruled that the director did not seek professional advice about the company’s financial position despite being advised in June 2010 that if Petrolink continued to trade, it may be trading whilst insolvent.
The principle
Directors should be aware that entering into payment arrangements does not provide relief from the debt being due and payable, and may simply be an assistance measure for companies requiring short-term relief. Director’s should be aware that in entering into repayment arrangements with the ATO, they may be providing evidence to a subsequently appointed liquidator that the company was insolvent and that the director was aware of the insolvency. As such, caution should be exercised by directors when entering into repayment arrangements that they only take on repayment commitments that the company can comply with else they risk incurring a personal liability for insolvent trading.
Conclusion
Directors need to be aware of the serious consequences of trading whilst insolvent, and the importance of seeking early professional advice about their company’s status and financial position. Taking the appropriate steps and action is not only a defence to any proceedings, but may be essential to the survival of the company. Where directors are not adequately informed or fail to deal with the potential insolvency of their companies in accordance with their duties as a company director, then they have a greater risk of becoming personally liable for the debts of their companies.
Tip Box
Whilst written for Victoria this article has interest and relevance for practitioners in all states.
Recent case law developments may have significance for directors and creditors
By O’Brien Palmer
INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS ADVISORY
First published on the website, www.obp.com.au
Introduction
Two decisions from the Supreme Court of New South Wales may be of interest to some readers. Although these decisions have been much commented upon within the insolvency industry, we have noted that the implications of these decisions may not have been broadly disseminated to others. The most recent decision pertained to the winding up of a corporate trustee, the result of which potentially exposes directors to significant personal liability. The second decision impacts on secured creditors when a company over which it holds security enters into voluntary administration.
Winding up a corporate trustee
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR SERVICE (AUST) PTY LIMITED (IN LIQ) (ICS) (NO 2) [2016] NSWSC 106
Readers may recall that in April 2015, we published an article about two conflicting decisions pertaining to the winding up of a corporate trustee. One of those decisions was handed down by his Honour Brereton, J. The decision in ICS flows on from his earlier judgement.
The Facts
ICS acted as trustee of the Independent Contractor Services Trust (the ICS Trust) that carried on a labour hire business. Following the completion of an audit, the Australian Taxation Office raised significant debts against ICS and as a result an administrator was appointed to ICS and it was subsequently wound up. The administrator/liquidator realised assets of the ICS Trust in the course of completing their duties. The ATO lodged a proof of debt in the winding up for $11.594M which included a priority claim of $2.274M in respect of unpaid superannuation guarantee charge. The liquidator applied to the court for numerous orders and directions but relevantly, directions were sought as to:
- the manner in which monies were to be distributed;
- the liquidator’s entitlement to remuneration.
The Distribution of Trust Assets
His Honour Brereton J found that section 556 of the Corporations Act (the Act), which sets out the order of priority for the distribution of monies realised from the assets of liquidated companies, does not apply to distributions from the proceeds of trust property. Although conceding that the law in relation to the distribution of trust property was not settled, Brereton J reasoned that the creditors of the trust should rank equally in the distribution of trust property. In any event, he said that in this particular case, even if subsection 556(1)(e) of the Act applied, the superannuation guarantee charge would not rank in priority as the contractors engaged by ICS were not its employees.
Remuneration
A liquidator of a company that is the trustee to a trading trust is entitled to be paid his or her costs and expenses. Approval of remuneration is ordinarily sought from creditors by liquidators pursuant to either section 473 or 499 of the Act. However, His Honour effectively said that these sections apply to company property only. Consequently, a liquidator of a trustee company must have his remuneration and disbursements approved by the court if they are to be paid out of the realisation of trust property.
Implications for Trustees & Directors
This decision may potentially impact upon directors of trustee companies in circumstances where superannuation or other employee entitlements remains unpaid at the date of the trustee company being wound up. Previously, we have published articles about the potential exposure of directors who do not properly manage the solvency or statutory compliance (superannuation, PAYG withholding) of their companies and become the subject of director’s penalty notices issued by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) or other liabilities for breach of duty including the duty to prevent the company from trading whilst insolvent.
A director’s capacity to recover monies paid to the ATO under the director’s penalty notice regime in respect of a company’s debts may be restricted in circumstances where employees remain unpaid on finalisation of the winding up of a trustee company as a result of the distribution of trust assets amongst trust creditors equally without regard to the priority usually afforded employee creditors. The failure of directors to ensure employee creditors are not disadvantaged may also exacerbate the negative impact of having breached their statutory and fiduciary duties to employees, creditors and other beneficiaries. As such, the decision highlights the importance of directors acting in this dual capacity to ensure that all employee entitlements are paid in full prior to winding up or replacing a corporate trustee.
Secured creditor and voluntary administration
BLUENERGY GROUP LIMITED (SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMPANY ARRANGEMENT DOCA) (ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED) (BLUENERGY) [2015] NSWSC 997
The Facts
Until recently, when a company went into administration and a deed of company arrangement was propounded, it was generally accepted that secured creditors would not be bound by the terms of the deed of company arrangement unless they voted for it. This allowed companies to manage their unsecured creditors without impacting on the rights of parties to whom the company had granted securities. However, for the first time since the introduction of Part 5.3A of the Act, the generally accepted practice that secured creditors would not be affected by deed of company arrangement agreements has been fundamentally altered.
In this case, Keybridge Capital Ltd (Keybridge) had advanced $300,000 to Bluenergy Group Ltd (Bluenergy) and was granted a second ranking circulating security interest in the assets of Bluenergy. In April 2014, voluntary administrators were appointed to Bluenergy. At that time, Keybridge was owed approximately $1.3 million.
A deed of company arrangement was approved by the creditors of the company and executed on 18 August 2014. The deed of company arrangement provided that all creditors’ claims were extinguished at the commencement of the deed. Keybridge did not participate in the voting as was standard practice for a secured creditor who did not intend to be bound by the terms of the deed of company arrangement.
On 19 March 2015, Keybridge appointed an administrator to Bluenergy pursuant to section 436C of the Act. The administrators of the deed of company arrangement objected to this appointment on the grounds that the deed of company arrangement had extinguished the debt owed to Keybridge. As such, the deed administrators argued that Keybridge was unable to appoint an administrator and that the appointment of the administrator be terminated.
Keybridge defended its actions on the grounds of subsection 444D(2) of the Act, which states in part that a deed ‘does not prevent a secured creditor from realising or otherwise dealing with the security interest’. The exception to this provision of the Act is if the secured creditor had voted for the deed of company arrangement or the court has ordered otherwise.
Findings in relation to Secured Creditors Rights
His Honour Black J found that:
- the deed of company arrangement extinguished the personal interest of Keybridge in the secured property (that is the debt owed by Bluenergy) in accordance with subsection 444D(1) of the Act by force of the release contained in the deed which took effect from the date of its execution;
- by reason of Keybridge abstaining from voting, that release was subject to the preservation of the ability of Keybridge to realise or otherwise deal with its proprietary interest in the property that was subject to its security immediately prior to the release of claims effected by the deed of company arrangement;
- even though Keybridge was entitled to appoint an administrator, the appointment should be terminated as it frustrated the purposes of Part 5.3A in that it was likely prejudicial to the interests of creditors who had approved the deed of company arrangement and in any event, there was no utility in its continuance as the only debt owing in the subsequent administration was the previous administrator who opposed the second appointment in circumstances where the debt to Keybridge had been extinguished.
In summary, the effect of the deed of company arrangement in these circumstances was to extinguish the debt owed by the company to its secured creditor without compromising the rights that the secured creditor held over the property of the company the subject of its security. Although it was entitled to appoint an administrator to the company, there was no point in doing so as it was effectively no longer a creditor of the company and the only remaining creditor of the company opposed the appointment.
Implications for Secured Creditors
This decision has serious implications for secured lenders and will probably result in secured creditors becoming more interventionist in deed of company arrangement negotiations, particularly in relation to release provisions which often do not become effective until conclusion or effectuation of the deed of company arrangement. It could also result in secured creditors seeking to block approval of deed of company arrangement proposals or exercising rights to appoint a receiver and manager.
Directors beware
By O’Brien Palmer
INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS ADVISORY
First published on the website, www.obp.com.au
The Director Penalty Regime was introduced to give the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) power to make company directors personally liable for certain unpaid company taxation debts. It is imperative that company directors and their advisors understand the regime and its operation, in order that they can take steps to avoid personal liability.
In this newsletter, we discuss the operation of the regime, and most importantly, how director penalties are enforced. We also discuss changes to the regime introduced on 1 July 2012, which allow the ATO to hold a director personally liable even after an administrator or liquidator has been appointed to the company.
Imposition of Director Penalties
A director penalty is imposed on a director where certain company taxation debts remain unpaid at the end of the day on which they become due. A full listing of the taxation debts covered by the regime can be found in section 269-10 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), but the most common taxation debts to which the regime applies are PAYG withholding and superannuation guarantee charge. The regime also applies to estimates issued by the ATO in respect of these types of taxation debts.
For example, if a company withholds amounts from employee wages in respect of PAYG, the amounts withheld will become payable at a future date, known as the ‘due day’. If the withheld amounts are not paid to the ATO before the end of the due day, then a director penalty, equal to the amount of the unpaid PAYG is imposed on all directors of the company at the time the debt was incurred. The regime also applies to newly appointed or recently retired directors.
The due day for PAYG is usually the day on which a company’s BAS or IAS lodgement is due, and for superannuation guarantee charge it is one month and 28 days after the end of each financial quarter. Whilst a director penalty is imposed at this time, the ATO is prohibited from enforcing a director penalty until it has issued a Director Penalty Notice.
The director penalty and the corresponding company taxation debt are concurrent liabilities. If a company pays its taxation debt after a director penalty has been imposed under the regime, then the director penalty is also discharged to the same extent, and vice versa. Please note, discharging of a director penalty is different to remittance of a director penalty, which is discussed below.
Enforcement and Remittance of Director Penalties
The ATO must issue a Director Penalty Notice to a director and allow a period of 21 days before it can bring court proceedings against a director for the recovery of a director penalty.
The ATO is required to send a notice to the address of a director noted in the records maintained by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, whether or not that address is current. The ATO may alternatively send notice to a director at their registered tax agent’s address.
Once a director penalty has been imposed by the ATO, there are 3 ways in which a director can have that penalty remitted, namely:
- causing the company to comply with its obligations to pay amounts to the ATO; or
- appointing a voluntary administrator to the company; or
- having a liquidator appointed to the company.
Directors should note that these remittance provisions are available prior to the issuance of a Director Penalty Notice by the ATO. It is appropriate for directors to consider exercising these options as soon as they become aware of taxation debts remaining unpaid after the due day.
If a valid Director Penalty Notice has been issued, and 21 days has passed since it was issued, the remittance provisions are no longer available to a company director, and either the company or the director must pay the amount due to the ATO.
Lock-Down Director Penalty Notices – The Importance of Reporting
If PAYG or superannuation guarantee charge remains unreported and unpaid for more than 3 months after the due day, a director is unable to have a director penalty remitted by the appointment of an administrator or liquidator. In these circumstances, the ATO must still issue a Director Penalty Notice, known as a Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice, and wait the required 21 days. Once the 21 days have passed, a director who receives a Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice must pay the director penalty, or cause the company to pay the corresponding company taxation debt.
It is important to note that the ATO is able to issue a Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice even after an administrator or liquidator has been appointed to a company, if applicable taxation debts that were not reported to the ATO within 3 months of the due day remain unpaid. The only way to avoid a Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice is to ensure that all company taxation debts are reported to the ATO within 3 months of the due day.
Defences to Director Penalties
In the event that proceedings are commenced against a director, there are only limited defences available to company directors. Those defences are:
- illness or incapacity (A director was unable to take part in the management of a company.);
- all reasonable steps (All reasonable steps were taken by a director to comply with his or her obligations, or no such steps were available.);
- superannuation guarantee charge – reasonably arguable position (A director adopted a reasonably arguable interpretation of superannuation guarantee charge legislation.).
Right of Indemnity and Contribution
A director that has paid a director penalty to the ATO, is entitled to recover that amount from the relevant company, in the same manner that a person can recover amounts paid under a guarantee of a company debt. A director that has paid a director penalty is also entitled to recover amounts from anyone that was also a director at the time the corresponding company taxation debt was incurred, as if all those directors were joint and several guarantors.
PAYG Withholding Non-Compliance Tax
Whilst not technically part of the regime, the PAYG withholding non-compliance tax was introduced with Lock-Down Director Penalty Notices. This new tax allows the ATO to deny a director, or their close associates, tax credits in their personal tax returns, where the PAYG withholding amounts have not been paid to the ATO. If a director has been issued a Director Penalty Notice, then they can also be denied credits on their personal tax return, for the same underlying principle company PAYG debt, in effect causing a director to pay twice at the same time. Of course if such a director does pay both amounts, it would be expected that they would obtain the benefit of the denied credits in the following period.
Garnishee on Directors’ Bank Accounts
Garnishees allow the ATO to compel payment from a third party that holds amounts due to, or on behalf of, a taxpayer that is indebted to the ATO. Once a Director Penalty Notice has been issued, and the 21 day period has expired, the ATO is entitled to seek a garnishee order against any third party that owes money to, or holds money on behalf of, the relevant director, including a director’s personal bank accounts.
Conclusion
The ATO will not hesitate to use the regime, and in particular Lock-Down Director Penalty Notices, as it is the only legislative method by which the ATO can hold a director personally liable for company debts. Directors and their advisors should ensure that timely and accurate financial information is available to facilitate prompt action when a company begins to have difficulty meeting its taxation obligations, or a director risks becoming personally liable.
The introduction of Lock-Down Director Penalty Notices to the regime means that reporting of taxation debts to the ATO is more important than ever. The looming spectre of a LockDown Director Penalty Notice should motivate all company directors to ensure that taxation debts are reported to the ATO on time, regardless of whether they are able to pay the debts being reported. Once the hard deadline of 3 months past the due day has expired, there is nothing a company director can do to avoid personal liability.
Winding up a corporate trustee
By O’Brien Palmer
INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS ADVISORY
First published on the website, www.obp.com.au
Introduction
Winding up a company that acts as the trustee of a trust is a common occurrence. Many of the underlying principles in liquidating a corporate trustee have long been established. However, the circumstances in which a liquidator has the power to deal with trust property still lack clarity. This has been highlighted in the conflicting decisions of the court that were handed down late last year; the first in the Federal Court of Australia in Kitay, in the matter of South West Kitchens (WA) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 670, the second in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the matter of Stansfield DIY Wealth Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2014] NSWSC 1484 (30 October 2014).
South West
The facts
The liquidator of South West sought directions from the court that he had the power to sell trust property pursuant to s 477(2)(c) of the Corporations Act 2001. The application was made in circumstances where there were potentially conflicting authorities as to the power of a liquidator in dealing with trust property. At the time of the Liquidator’s appointment:
- South West was trustee of the South West Kitchen Unit (Hybrid) Trust (the trust).
- All of the assets of South West were owned in its capacity as trustee of the trust.
- The trust deed for the trust provided that upon liquidation, South West was disqualified from acting as trustee.
The law
The ‘foundational concepts’ based on existing authorities were set out in the judgment of McKerracher J, delivered on 24 June 2014. These concepts are summarised as follows:
- A trustee has a right of indemnity out of the trust assets for expenses and liabilities incurred on behalf of the trust and a right of exoneration from liability.
- A trustee is entitled to the benefit of an equitable lien over the trust assets as a means of securing its rights of indemnity and/or exoneration.
- When a liquidator is appointed to a trustee company, the liquidator acquires the same rights of indemnity and exoneration.
- The equitable lien securing the trustee’s right of indemnity and exoneration does not give the (removed) trustee power of sale. Rather, it is a security which is enforceable by the trustee only by way of judicial sale or by the appointment of a receiver with a power of sale.
According to his Honour, the issue arising beyond these concepts and on which there may be some doubt in the authorities, is whether the liquidator of a trustee company that is unable to continue acting as trustee:
- can exercise the power of sale granted to liquidators pursuant to s 477(2)(c) of the Act;
- is required in each instance to obtain a court order to sell trust assets.
His Honour expressed the view that the operation of s 477(2)(c) in these circumstances had not been expressly considered in previous judgments, except in the decision of Finkelstein J in Apostolou v VA Corporation AUST Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 64A (Apostolou). In that case, his Honour found that the liquidator had a dual power to realise trust assets in the course of winding up a company which acted as trustee, where the company has both legal title and an equitable interest in the trust assets; that power being conferred pursuant to the trust deed and also pursuant to s 477(2)(c) of the Act.
The decision
In delivering his judgment, his Honour followed the decision in Apostolou, finding that:
- South West had both legal ownership of the assets of the trust as a bare trustee and beneficial interest in the assets as a holder of an equitable lien.
- There is no reason in policy or principle and none referred to in the authorities discussed, as to the why a liquidator’s powers of sale should be limited by the terms of a private trust agreement.
- There appears to be no constraint on the power of sale under s 477(2)(c) of the Act, nor does it impose any limitation on the power of sale insofar as the assets of a company held on trust.
- In the absence of any statutory constraint or other complication, there appears to be no other reason why a liquidator ought not be permitted in a straightforward case to discharge their duties to conduct the liquidation in the ordinary manner.
- Proceeding this way makes good practical sense avoiding the need for liquidators of trustee companies to approach the court on every occasion to seek approval to sell trust assets.
Accordingly, his Honour declared that the liquidator had power pursuant to s 477(2)(c) of the Act to sell, dispose or otherwise deal with the assets of the trust.
Stansfield
The facts
The liquidator of Stansfield sought directions from the court to the effect that the company in liquidation be permitted to sell or otherwise deal with the property of a superannuation fund. This application was no doubt filed in light of the potentially conflicting authorities but with the added complication that the property in question was held on account of a superannuation fund. At the time of the liquidator’s appointment;
- Stansfield was acting as trustee of the Elliot Stansfield Super Fund, a regulated selfmanaged superannuation fund (the fund).
- The assets of the fund totalled $108,916.
- The liabilities of the fund totalled $98,941.
- The only function of Stansfield was to act as trustee of the fund.
The law
In his judgment delivered on 30 October 2014, Brereton J said that there were two relevant potential scenarios; the first that the company in liquidation remained as trustee of the fund and the second, the company in liquidation does not remain as trustee of the fund.
The company in liquidation remaining as trustee of the fund
In relation to the first scenario, his Honour concluded that so long as the company in liquidation remained as trustee of the fund, then the liquidator was entitled (subject to the impact of superannuation laws) to administer the assets of the fund, pay the creditors of the fund, wind up the fund and recover all of his remuneration and expenses from the assets of the fund.
The company in liquidation not remaining as trustee of the fund
In relation to the second scenario, his Honour essentially agreed with the foundational concepts set out in South West which are summarised above. His Honour then when on to consider the possible application of s 477(2)(c) of the Act in light of the relevant case law and particular, the judgments delivered in Apostolou and South West.
The conclusion reached by his Honour was that he respectfully disagreed with the decision in Apostolou, finding instead that s 477(2)(c) does not empower a liquidator to sell the beneficial interest in property that a company holds on trust even if the company holds an equitable charge over that property because the property is not itself ‘property of the company’. To put that another way, a liquidator’s power to deal with property does not extend to property that is not beneficially the property of the company.
The impact of superannuation law
His Honour was obliged to also consider the operation of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SISA) concluding that a company in liquidation becomes a ‘disqualified person’ for the purposes of that legislation but notwithstanding, remains as trustee of the fund. However, by continuing to be and act as trustee, a company contravenes s 126K of SISA and thereby commits an offence. If, as would be prudent, a company resigned as trustee once a liquidator has been appointed to it, then the liquidator would have no power of sale.
The decision
In light of the foregoing, his Honour declined to make the direction sought by the liquidator. Rather, his Honour proposed to make declarations and orders pursuant to s 479(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 to the following effect:
- The liquidator would be justified in causing the company to resign as trustee of the fund.
- The liquidator would be justified in applying to the court to be appointed as receiver without security of the assets of the fund with the powers that a liquidator has in respect of the property of a company under s 477(2)(c) of the Act.
Conclusion
It is obvious from these judgments that the law is not settled in relation to dealing with trust property in circumstances where the trustee company has been wound up and is no longer acting in that capacity. The decision in South West is commercially sensible and avoids the need for a liquidator of a trustee company to approach the court on every occasion trust property is to be sold. This of course conflicts with the judgment in Stansfield. This conflict needs to be resolved either by the legislature or the High Court of Australia. In the meantime, a liquidator appointed to a trustee company will be subject to the law of trusts in the particular state in which he or she practises and will need to seek legal advice as to the appropriate way to deal with trust assets. The partners of O’Brien Palmer are presently minded to follow the process in Stansfield until such time as they are advised otherwise.
Why would anyone want to be a director?
By O’Brien Palmer
INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS ADVISORY
First published on the website, www.obp.com.au
A GUIDE TO DIRECTOR’S DUTIES
Introduction
Many people who accept an appointment as a company director or secretary are completely unaware of the potential risks they face from personal liability, civil penalty or criminal conviction. These risks arise primarily from failing to comply with statutory duties contained within the Corporations Act 2001 (‘the Act’) that largely mirror those duties which have been enshrined in the Common Law. In addition to those duties, there are a plethora of obligations imposed upon directors by other state and federal legislation such as taxation laws, employment standards, work health and safety regulations, environmental protection measures, consumer protection strategies, Australian Stock Exchange listing rules for publicly listed companies and privacy protocols.
In short, a person acting as a director should take his or her duties seriously. This is especially true in times of financial difficulty. This newsletter will concentrate on the duties of directors, other officers and in some cases employees as set out in the Act and the potential liability for breaching those duties.
Who has a duty to comply?
It is important to consider the persons who are obligated to comply with their statutory duties. Section 9 of the Act defines ‘officer’ to include a director, secretary or any person who acts in the position of a director, regardless of the name that is given to their position. A person who acts in the position of a director is often referred to as a ‘shadow-director’. It is worth noting that external administrators are similarly subject to the same duties as officers.
Directors duties
General Duties – Civil Obligations
Set out in the table below are the duties of company officers which if contravened, give rise to civil obligations.
Duty | Relevant Information |
Care & Diligence Section 180(1) |
An officer of a company must exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would in the same circumstances. |
Defence Section 180(2) |
Business Judgement Rule – A person who makes a “business judgment” does not breach their duty, if they: make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; and do not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; and make an informed decision; and rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. |
Good Faith Section 181 |
An officer of a company must exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests of the company and for a proper purpose. |
Use of Position Section 182 |
A person who is an officer or employee of a company must not improperly use their position to: gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or cause detriment to the company. |
Use of Information Section 183 |
A person who obtains information because they are, or have been, an officer of a company or an employee must not improperly use that information to; gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or cause detriment to the company. |
If a person does not meet these requirements, and the Court is satisfied that the person has contravened one of the sections, then the Court can make a declaration of contravention pursuant to section 1317E of the Act, and:
- impose a fine of up to $200,000 (section 1317G of the Act); and
- disqualify a director from managing companies (section 206C of the Act).
The Courts are also able to impose other remedies for breach of duty. Section 598(2) of the Act provides that where the Court is satisfied that a person is guilty of fraud, negligence, default, breach of trust, or breach of duty and the company has suffered or is likely to suffer loss or damage as a result, then the Court may, on the application of either the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’), an Administrator, a Liquidator or a person nominated by ASIC, make an order pursuant to section 598(4) of the Act directing that person:
- to pay money or transfer property to the company; and
- to pay to the company the amount of the loss or damage.
General Duties – Criminal Offences
Section 184 of the Act effectively states that an offence is committed if a person recklessly or dishonestly breaches sections 181, 182 or 183 of the Act. Persons who commit these offences may be criminally liable and be fined amounts up to $220,000 and/or be imprisoned for up to five years.
Insolvent Trading
Section 588G(1) of the Act imposes a duty on directors to prevent their companies from trading whilst insolvent. This section applies if a person was a director of a company at the time when the company incurs the debt and is insolvent at that time or becomes insolvent as result of that transaction and the director had reasonable grounds to suspect the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of entering that transaction.
Breaching this duty can result is in ASIC seeking from the Court a declaration of contravention against a director and the imposition of a civil penalty pursuant to sections 1317E and 1317G of the Act. In addition and on an application for a civil penalty order, the Court has the power pursuant to section 588J of the Act to make orders:
- disqualifying a person from managing companies (section 206C of the Act); and
- requiring a person to pay to the company compensation equal to the loss or damage suffered by the company.
A breach of this duty is a criminal offence pursuant to section 588G(3) of the Act if the failure to prevent the company from incurring the debt was dishonest. Furthermore and in the event of liquidation, if a director has breached this section, then pursuant to section 588M(2) of the Act, the company’s liquidator may recover from the director, as a debt due to the company, an amount equal to the loss or damage suffered by the company. Alternatively, a creditor of the company, may with the consent of the liquidator, begin proceedings pursuant to section 588M(3) of the Act to recover from a director as a debt due to the creditor, an amount equal to the loss and damage suffered by the creditor directors who are the subject of claims in relation to insolvent trading may be able to avail themselves of the defences which are set out in section 588H of the Act.
Maintenance of Proper Books & Records
Section 286(1) of the Act imposes an obligation on company directors to maintain adequate books and records that:
- correctly record and explain its transactions and financial position and performance;
- enable true and fair financial statements to be prepared and audited.
This obligation extends to transactions undertaken by a company as a trustee.
Section 286(2) requires that the books and records of the Company be maintained for a period of seven years. Pursuant to sections 344 and 1317E of the Act, the penalties for breaching these duties may include:
- the imposition of a fine of up to $200,000 (section 1317G of the Act);
- disqualification from managing companies (section 206C of the Act).
Section 588E(4) of the Act provides that where a company is being wound up, and in circumstances where that company has failed to maintain proper records or retain them for the requisite period, then the company will be presumed to be insolvent for the period for which the records are not available. This can give rise to serious consequences where it is being alleged that a director has allowed a company to trade whilst insolvent.
Click here to view ASIC website – What books and records should my company keep?
Trust liabilities
Corporate trustees are very common. Pursuant to section 197 of the Act, where a company is acting as or purporting to act as trustee and incurs a liability which it cannot meet, a director of that company can be held liable to discharge the whole or part of the liability if the company is not entitled to be fully indemnified against the liability out of trust assets because of one or more of the following:
- the company has breached its trust;
- the company was acting outside the scope of its powers as trustee;
- a term of the trust denying, or limiting, the company’s rights to be indemnified against the liability
General Requirements
In addition to the foregoing, the Act requires directors to:
- update the company database maintained by ASIC as required to ensure its accuracy in accordance with sections 142, 146, 168, 205B, and 205D of the Act.
- comply with all reasonable requirements and provide proper assistance to validly appointed external administrators pursuant to sections 475 and 530A of the Act.
- refrain from acting as a director of a company, whether formally appointed or not, if excluded from doing so pursuant to sections 206B and 206C of the Act. This most relevantly excludes bankrupts or anyone who has entered into a personal insolvency agreement under Part X of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
- disclose to other directors of their companies any potential material conflicts of interests that they might have in relation to the conduct of their duties as director in accordance with sections 191 – 195 of the Act.
External administrators’ obligation to report to ASIC
A liquidator, in carrying out an investigation into the affairs of a company and the conduct of its principles, has a statutory duty pursuant to section 533 of the Act to file a report with ASIC if the expected dividend is less than 50 cents in the dollar, setting out any identified potential offences or breaches of duty committed by officers, employees or shareholders of a Company. At its discretion, ASIC may require the liquidator to submit a supplementary report particularising the alleged offences or breaches of duty, and may also provide funding for that purpose. Similar provisions apply to a voluntary administrator or receiver if appointed.
Conclusion
If company officers and employees adopt ethical and prudent business practices, then they are unlikely to breach their statutory duties. ASIC has issued an explanatory memorandum as to the general duties of directors and other officers, those duties being summarised above. In the summary, ASIC advises that company officers can greatly reduce their exposure by having appropriate insurance, and if they carry out their duties by;
- being honest and careful in their dealings.
- remaining active and involved in the company’s operations.
- making sure that their companies can pay their debts on time.
- maintaining proper financial records.
- acting in the best interests of their companies.
As always, directors should take appropriate professional advice from their accountants, solicitors and advisors if they are in any doubt as to their duties, or as to the consequences of potential breaches.
Income contributions and accumulated savings in bankruptcy
By O’Brien Palmer
INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS ADVISORY
First published on the website, www.obp.com.au
Introduction
Debtors facing bankruptcy often ask questions about the amount of income they can earn as a bankrupt and whether they can retain surplus income that might be accumulated during the period of their bankruptcy. The purpose of this newsletter is to explain the operation of the income contribution assessment regime and the manner in which a trustee is required to deal with any accumulated savings.
Income
Pursuant to sub-section 139W(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (“the Act”), a trustee is required to make an assessment of the income of a bankrupt that is likely to be derived or which was derived during the bankruptcy period. In practice, at the commencement of the bankruptcy and then every year thereafter, a trustee will issue an income questionnaire to be completed by the bankrupt. Based on the information provided, a trustee will assess whether the bankrupt is liable to make contributions from their income. If the bankrupt is found to be liable, then the bankrupt will normally arrange to make regular installment payments.
Pursuant to sub-sections 139W(2) and 139WA(1) of the Act a trustee can issue a fresh assessment if they are satisfied that the actual income derived by the bankrupt varies from the amount originally estimated. This may occur at any time during or after the end of a contribution period or even after the bankrupt is discharged.
What is income
Section 139L of the Act defines income very broadly and includes:
- Wages and salary.
- Taxable fringe benefits.
- Superannuation receipts, annuities and pensions.
- Loans from associated entities.
- Income earned overseas.
- Business profits of a sole trader.
- Super contributions in excess of 9.5%.
Importantly, pursuant to section 139M(1), income is taken as being derived by the bankrupt even though it isn’t actually received by the bankrupt. For example, income which is reinvested or income which is dealt with on behalf of the bankrupt or as the bankrupt directs.
How is the assessment calculated
Section 139S of the Act provides that the amount of the contribution required to be paid by a bankrupt is 50% of the after tax income which exceeds the ‘actual income threshold amount’.
What is the actual income threshold amount
The actual income threshold amount is the amount of income a bankrupt may earn upon which no contribution is payable. In accordance with section 139K of the Act, the threshold amount is determined by reference to the number of dependants for whom the bankrupt is responsible. The current amounts, which are updated twice yearly, are set out in the table below.
Number of Dependants | Threshold Amount |
0 | $53,653.60 |
1 | $63,311.25 |
2 | $68,140.07 |
3 | $70,822.75 |
4 | $71,895.82 |
Over 4 | $72,968.90 |
It is worth noting that if a bankrupt disagrees with the assessment of their income contributions, then pursuant to section 139Z, they are able to seek a review of the assessment by the Official Trustee.
What happens if a bankrupt earns less than expected
In order to prevent a bankrupt from circumventing the income contribution provisions by earning less money than they would otherwise, a trustee may, pursuant to section 139Y of the Act, make a determination that the bankrupt receives or has received what is called ‘reasonable remuneration’ and increase his or her income for assessment purposes accordingly. This prevents the bankrupt from channelling income into other entities or coming to an arrangement with their employer, especially if related, to reduce their reportable income.
What happens in the case of hardship
If a bankrupt considers that the requirement to pay contributions will cause hardship, then pursuant to sub-section 139T(1) of the Act, they may apply to their trustee for the assessment to be varied. Sub-section 139T(2) sets out the specific grounds upon which such an application can be made. Such an application is required to be in writing and to include evidence of the bankrupt’s income and expenses. The grounds for a hardship application are as follows:
- Ongoing medical expenses.
- Costs of child day care essential for work.
- Particularly high rent when there are no alternatives available.
- Substantial expenses of travelling to and from work.
- Loss of financial contribution.
What happens if a bankrupt does not comply
Failing to provide information relating to income or expected income as required by the Act constitutes grounds for an objection to automatic discharge pursuant to sub-section 149D(1)(e). In addition, if a contribution amount is owed and remains outstanding prior to discharge, then a trustee may object to the discharge, pursuant to subsection 149D(1)(f). Any such objection may extend the period of the bankruptcy by a further 5 years.
If the bankrupt does not provide particulars of their income or advises that they did not derive any income, however there are reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt is likely to derive income then, pursuant to section 139Z, the trustee may determine the income of a bankrupt and prepare an assessment accordingly.
Trustees have a number of other powers available to them to compel the compliance of the bankrupt with their obligations in relation to contribution assessments. These include instructing the bankrupt pursuant to section 139ZIF to pay income into an account supervised by a trustee. A trustee is then required to supervise withdrawals from that account. Furthermore, if an amount remains due and payable after the date of automatic discharge, then a trustee may enforce the debt against the bankrupt in the ordinary course in accordance with sub-sections 139ZG(3) and (4) including making the debtor bankrupt again.
Accumulated savings
Sub-section 58(1)(b) of the Act states that property that is acquired by or devolves upon a bankrupt during the period of their bankruptcy vests in their trustee. Property of this nature is referred to as after-acquired property, one of the best examples being the receipt of an inheritance whilst bankrupt. Another such example might be accumulated savings. These funds would ordinarily be surplus income that may or may not have been assessed for contribution purposes. Until recently there was an assumption based on case law that accumulated savings derived from income do not vest in a trustee. However, a recent decision of the Full Bench of the Federal Court of Australia in the matter of Di Cioccio v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Di Cioccio)[2015] FCAFC 30, has authoritatively examined the interaction between the income contribution regime and after-acquired property.
The facts of the case are relatively simple. An undischarged bankrupt used money that was held in a bank account to acquire shares, the money was derived from income earned within the period of the bankruptcy that did not exceed the actual income threshold amount. The bankrupt informed the Official Trustee of his intention to acquire a motor vehicle that was to be funded from the sale of the shares. The bankrupt was informed that the shares vested in the Official Trustee pursuant to sub-section 58(1). The bankrupt sought a review of the stance taken by the Official Trustee.
In essence, the court found that the shares vested in the Official Trustee in accordance with subsection 58(1)(b). The court went on to say that accumulated savings derived from income during the period of the bankruptcy would also constitute after-acquired property. In considering this, the court was conscious of sub-section 134(1)(ma) which gives a trustee the power to:
‘make such allowance out of an estate as they think just to the bankrupt, the spouse or de facto partner of the bankrupt or the family of the bankrupt’.
Interestingly, the court also put the proposition that if the money was being accumulated to acquire tools of trade for income earning purposes then the bankrupt may be able to retain the money on the basis that such tools of trade, if acquired, constitute property that is not available to creditors pursuant to sub-section 116(2)(c).
Conclusion
This case makes it abundantly clear that it is in the best interests of all bankrupts to be open and transparent with their trustee in relation to their income and to manage any contributions for which they are liable. In circumstances where a bankrupt saves their surplus income and does not pay regular instalments to their trustee, then a trustee may take possession of the accumulated savings and the bankrupt could remain liable to pay assessed contributions. This may become a situation where a trustee can exercise their discretion pursuant to sub-section 134(1)(ma) of the Act, taking into account the circumstances of the bankrupt.
Directors beware – Piercing the corporate veil – The ATO and DPNs
By O’Brien Palmer
INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS ADVISORY
First published on the website, www.obp.com.au
Directors beware
The Director Penalty Regime (‘the Regime’) was introduced to give the Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO’) power to make company directors personally liable for certain unpaid company taxation debts. It is imperative that company directors and their advisors understand the Regime and its operation, in order that they can take steps to avoid personal liability.
In this newsletter, we discuss the operation of the Regime, and most importantly, how director penalties are enforced. We also discuss changes to the Regime introduced on 1 July 2012, which allow the ATO to hold a director personally liable even after an Administrator or Liquidator has been appointed to the company.
Imposition of director penalties
A director penalty is imposed on a director where certain company taxation debts remain unpaid at the end of the day on which they become due. A full listing of the taxation debts covered by the Regime can be found in division 269-10 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), but the most common taxation debts to which the Regime applies are PAYG Withholding (‘PAYG’) and Superannuation Guarantee Charge (‘SGC’). The Regime also applies to estimates issued by the ATO in respect of these types of taxation debts.
For example, if a company withholds amounts from employee wages in respect of PAYG, the amounts withheld will become payable at a future date, known as the ‘Due Day’. If the withheld amounts are not paid to the ATO before the end of the Due Day, then a director penalty, equal to the amount of the unpaid PAYG is imposed on all directors of the company at the time the debt was incurred. The regime also applies to newly appointed or recently retired directors.
The Due Day for PAYG is usually the day on which a company’s BAS or IAS lodgment is due, and for SGC it is one month and 28 days after the end of each financial quarter. Whilst a director penalty is imposed at this time, the ATO is prohibited from enforcing a director penalty until it has issued a Director Penalty Notice.
The director penalty and the corresponding company taxation debt are concurrent liabilities. If a company pays its taxation debt after a director penalty has been imposed under the Regime, then the director penalty is also discharged to the same extent, and vice versa. (N.B. Discharging of a director penalty is different to remittance of a director penalty, which is discussed below.)
Enforcement and remittance of director penalties
The ATO must issue a Director Penalty Notice to a director and allow a period of 21 days before it can bring court proceedings against a director for the recovery of a director penalty. The ATO is only required to send a notice to the address of a director noted in the records maintained by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, whether or not that address is current. The ATO may alternatively send notice to a director at his or hers registered tax agent’s address.
Once a director penalty has been imposed by the ATO, there are three ways in which a director can have that penalty remitted, namely;
- Causing the company to comply with its obligations to pay amounts to the ATO; or
- Appointing a Voluntary Administrator to the company; or
- Having a Liquidator appointed to the company.
Directors should note that these remittance provisions are available prior to the issuance of a Director Penalty Notice by the ATO. It is appropriate for directors to consider exercising these options as soon as they become aware of taxation debts remaining unpaid after the Due Day.
If a valid Director Penalty Notice has been issued, and 21 days has passed since it was issued, the remittance provisions are no longer available to a company director, and either the company or the director must pay the amount due to the ATO.
Lock-down director penalty notices – the importance of reporting
If PAYG or SGC remains unreported and unpaid for more than three months after the Due Day, a director is unable to have a director penalty remitted by the appointment of an Administrator or Liquidator. In these circumstances, the ATO must still issue a Director Penalty Notice, known as a ‘Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice’, and wait the required 21 days. Once the 21 days have passed, a director who receives a ‘Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice’ must pay the director penalty, or cause the company to pay the corresponding company taxation debt.
It is important to note that the ATO is able to issue a Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice, even after an Administrator or Liquidator has been appointed to a Company, if applicable taxation debts that were not reported to the ATO within three months of the Due Day remain unpaid. The only way to avoid a Lock-Down Director Penalty Notice is to ensure that all company taxation debts are reported to the ATO within three months of the Due Day.
Defences to director penalties
In the event that proceedings are commenced against a director, there are only limited defenses available to company directors. Those defenses are:
- Illness or Incapacity (A director was unable to take part in the management of a company.)
- All Reasonable Steps (All reasonable steps were taken by a director to comply with his or her obligations, or no such steps were available.)
- Superannuation Guarantee Charge – Reasonably Arguable Position (A director adopted a reasonably arguable interpretation of Superannuation Guarantee Charge legislation.)
Right of indemnity and contribution
A director that has paid a director penalty to the ATO, is entitled to recover that amount from the relevant company, in the same manner that a person can recover amounts paid under a guarantee of a company debt. A director that has paid a director penalty is also entitled to recover amounts from anyone that was also a director at the time the corresponding company taxation debt was incurred, as if all those directors were joint & several guarantors.
PAYG withholding non-compliance tax
Whilst not technically part of the Regime, the PAYG Withholding NonCompliance tax was introduced with Lock-Down Director Penalty Notices. This new tax allows the ATO to deny a director, or their close associates, tax credits in their personal tax returns, where the PAYG Withholding amounts have not been paid to the ATO. If a director has been issued a Director Penalty Notice, then he or she can also be denied credits on their personal tax return, for the same underlying principle company PAYG debt, in effect causing a director to pay twice at the same time. Of course if such a director does pay both amounts, it would be expected that he or she would obtain the benefit of the denied credits in the following period.
Garnishee on directors’ bank accounts
Garnishees allow the ATO to compel payment from a third party that holds amounts due to, or on behalf of, a taxpayer that is indebted to the ATO. Once a Director Penalty Notice has been issued, and the 21 day period has expired, the ATO is entitled to seek a garnishee order against any third party that owes money to, or holds money on behalf of, the relevant director, including a director’s personal bank accounts.
Conclusion
The ATO will not hesitate to use the Regime, and in particular Lock-Down Director Penalty Notices as it is the only legislative method by which the ATO can hold a director personally liable for company debts. Directors and their advisors should ensure that timely and accurate financial information is available to facilitate prompt action when a company begins to have difficulty meeting its taxation obligations, or a director risks becoming personally liable.
The introduction of Lock-Down Director Penalty Notices to the Regime means that reporting of taxation debts to the ATO is more important than ever. The looming spectre of a LockDown Director Penalty Notice should motivate all company directors to ensure that taxation debts are reported to the ATO on time, regardless of whether they are able to pay the debts being reported. Once the hard deadline of three months past the Due Day has expired, there is nothing a company director can do to avoid personal liability.
Pre-packs – Do they have a place in Australian insolvency practice?
By O’Brien Palmer
INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS ADVISORY
First published on the website, www.obp.com.au
You may have noticed the occasional reference in the media to fraudulent phoenix activity and attempts by government agencies such as ASIC (Australian Securities and Investments Commission) and the ATO (Australian Taxation Office) to ‘crackdown’ on serial offenders, particularly in the building and construction industry. Phoenix activity typically involves the transfer of the business assets of a company to a new entity, with creditors being left behind with no real prospect of payment.
There has been recent discussion in the profession about the distinguishing features of a phoenix and a bird of a different feather known as a ‘pre-pack’. In the United Kingdom, pre-packs are a legitimate and accepted means to phoenix the business of a company. In Australia, there is no formal pre-pack procedure although variations of the process are often used by those who specialise in the area, particularly in the turnaround sphere. Where this occurs, the bona fides of the directors are often treated with scepticism. However in many instances, the transfer of assets from one company to a related entity may in fact be in the best interest of all stakeholders of the insolvent company.
In this newsletter, we explore phoenix activity and examine the pre-pack concept.
What is a phoenix company?
A phoenix company is usually considered to be one which is established to carry on the business of an insolvent company, using the assets and employing the staff of the insolvent company, but without accepting liability for its debts. In most cases, the members and directors of the phoenix company are the same or at least related to those of the insolvent company. The business rises from its burden of debt in a new corporate entity, using the same or a similar name, but the creditors of the insolvent company are left to recover what they can for the amounts owed to them through the liquidation process.
Is phoenix activity fraudulent?
Current legislation does not explicitly prohibit phoenix activity. However the process is one that can be easily abused with the result that the activity is often referred to as being fraudulent. Examples of phoenix activity generally considered to be fraudulent include:
- transferring the business and/or assets of a company to a new entity for less than fair market value and/or on terms considered to be uncommercial;
- establishing a corporate structure for the express purpose of defeating creditors by incurring liabilities through that company whilst keeping assets safe in a related entity;
- deliberately incurring company debt immediately prior to the transfer of the business and/or its assets, without having any expectation that the company would be able to pay that debt.
In order to combat such activity, remedies are available within the Corporations Act, which has a number of provisions dealing with breach of duties by directors as well as provisions designed to protect creditors in the event of insolvency. Proven breaches of these provisions can result in civil and/or criminal penalties. Furthermore, the ATO is strengthening its powers using the director penalty notice regime by providing disincentives to fraudulent phoenix activity by making directors personally liable in certain circumstances for their company’s unreported unpaid superannuation and pay-as-you-go withholding amounts.
The applicable provisions of the Corporations Act are as follows:
- If the phoenix sale of a company’s business and assets is for less than fair market value or on terms considered to be uncommercial, then it may be challenged as an uncommercial transaction (section 588FB), as an unreasonable director-related transaction (section 588FDA), or as a transaction to defeat creditors (subsection 588FE(5)).
- If the sale is not in the best interest of the creditors, the directors may have breached their duties to the company and its creditors. These duties include the duty to act with care and diligence (section 180), to act in good faith and for a proper purpose (section 181) and to not improperly use their position or any information obtained because of their position to gain advantage for themselves or cause detriment to the company (sections 182 and 183). Should it be proven that the breach of any of these sections occurred with either deliberate intention or recklessness, then the breach may result in criminal liability for the director/s (section 184).
- Pursuant to subsection 598(2), where the court is satisfied that a person is guilty of fraud, negligence, breach of trust or duty and the company has suffered loss or damage as a result, the court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate in relation to that person.
- If employees and employee entitlements are not handled correctly, the director risks committing the criminal offence of entering into a transaction with the intention of avoiding employee entitlements (section 596AB).
- If the directors do not prevent all unnecessary liabilities from being incurred once they realise a company may be insolvent, or likely to become insolvent, then they may have breached their duty to prevent insolvent trading (section 588G) and risk being held personally liable for those debts. If the failure to prevent liabilities from being incurred is proven to be dishonest, then the breach may constitute a criminal offence (section 588G(3)).
Proponents of pre-packs argue that, if properly completed, directors will avoid breaching the above legislative provisions.
What is a pre-pack?
A pre-pack is a sale process through which the sale of the business and/or assets of an insolvent company is agreed prior to the appointment of an insolvency practitioner, whose task is to review the sale terms and, if thought appropriate, ratify the sale. The model adopted in the United Kingdom has elements that would not be considered acceptable under Australian law and practice. For example, in the United Kingdom, an insolvency practitioner will work with management to arrange the sale of the business and assets and, after those arrangements have been made, he or she will then be formally appointed as administrator. The conflict of interest is obvious. The pre-pack model, modified to suit the Australian environment, has three distinct steps, namely:
- Preparation
- The directors will have the business and assets of the company valued by a reputable valuer. The sale of the company’s business and assets should be based on this valuation to ensure that fair market price is obtained.
- The directors should prevent all non-essential debts from being incurred. In doing so, they will reduce any exposure to insolvent trading.
- Execution
- The directors then arrange the sale of the company business and/or assets to another entity, for fair market value. A conditional contract would be executed together with an agreement to operate the business under licence. To prevent the appearance of any impropriety, the completion of the contract should be subject to ratification by an administrator who would in the ordinary course seek creditor input.
- The employees of the company would ordinarily be transferred to the new company, which will accept responsibility for their accrued entitlements.
- The business continues being operated by the new company.
- Ratification
- The insolvent company then appoints an administrator (or possibly a liquidator), who will investigate the sale, test the market if appropriate, and report to creditors. The expectation of management is that the sale will be ratified. If that transpires then the administrator will complete the sale.
- If the sale is not ratified, then the contract will be rescinded. Responsibility for operating and selling the business would then revert to the administrator.
Importantly, the insolvency practitioner to be appointed administrator should not advise on the process. This ensures that, following appointment, the administrator can act, and be seen to act, independently of those involved in the transaction.
If, for some reason, a sale was completed prior to appointment, then it is likely that the company would be wound up by way of a creditors’ voluntary liquidation. In those circumstances and as in any winding up, the liquidator would review the sale, and in the event it is found to be unreasonable, then he may, if commercial to do so, seek to overturn the sale under the voidable transactions provisions of the Act. The liquidator would then realise the assets for the best price possible.
Why pre-pack and not administration?
The voluntary administration regime was introduced in 1993, and was designed to provide a flexible mechanism for a company’s affairs to be administered in such a way that maximises the chances of the company or its business remaining in existence or, if that is not possible, results in a better return to creditors. It does this by imposing a moratorium on the company’s creditors, giving an administrator time to investigate the company’s affairs and consider a proposal for the company’s debt to be compromised. The proposal can take many forms and, if accepted by creditors, the company will then enter into a Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA).
As the legislative framework for flexible restructure is already in place, then why bother with a pre-pack sale? Critics of the voluntary administration process argue it is cumbersome, intrusive, costly and detrimental to the business. Proponents of pre-packs claim they offer a better chance for existing management to save their business and for creditors to maximise their return. They say pre-packs do this by:
- ensuring the continuation of the business in a new entity;
- preserving the goodwill of the business and its suppliers and customers;
- maximising the value of company business and assets;
- avoiding a costly trade-on administration pending a sale.
In addition, creditors should have the comfort of knowing the sale is subject to review and ratification by an independent administrator. However, there are other considerations that need to be taken into account, namely:
- The company will still have go through the administration process and bear the consequential costs of the administrator possibly testing the market and dealing with enquiries which may extend to entering into negotiations for the sale of the business and assets.
- The appointment of an administrator and the subsequent winding up of the company will still leave the directors exposed to potential claims under the Corporations Act – for example, claims resulting from trading whilst insolvent. This means that the directors may still have to consider propounding a DOCA as part of the pre-pack process, further adding to the costs that might be incurred.
- The directors or owners of the entity acquiring the business and assets will need to arrange funding not only of the agreed purchase price but also ongoing working capital. In many instances buying the business and assets of a company will not be a practical option.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding phoenix activity continues, in which the cost to the community is contrasted with the efficiency and other benefits of the pre-pack process. Should directors who phoenix the business of their companies be held more accountable? Or should the interests of creditors in an increased commercial return supersede government concerns over the director’s bona fides? The government is considering further legislative amendments to inhibit deliberate, cyclic, fraudulent phoenix activity. In this regard you might be aware that earlier this year, the government introduced what is commonly called the Similar Names Bill, which sought to amend the Corporations Act to make a director of a failed company personally liable for its debts where the related entities had the same or similar names. We understand this Bill has made no progress but it is an indication of the government’s intentions.
Whilst the voluntary administration regime already provides a mechanism for the restructure of a company’s business, it is often criticised. Proponents of pre-packs argue that a pre-pack sale of a company’s business will in many instances deliver better results than can be achieved through a standard administration, and that sufficient safeguards already exist within the Corporations Act to protect creditors’ interests. We consider that, in certain circumstances, a formal pre-pack process may be more effective than voluntary administration. We also consider that the concept deserves to be further explored.
This article was written by O’Brien Palmer insolvency authors. They are a specialist practice with national affiliations, focusing on corporate and personal insolvency and business recovery. They are committed to assisting solicitors help their clients understand and navigate the complex realms of insolvency.